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OPINION
THE CABLE TELEVISION "PRESS" AND THE
PROTECTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENTA NOT So "VEXING QUESTION"
JOHN

P. COLE, JR.*
ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court recently declared that cable television operators engage in
"speech within the scope of the First Amendment to the Constitution and
• . constitute a part of the press." The limits imposed by the Speech and Press
clause on the exercise of governmental power notwithstanding, the Congress, the
Federal Communications Commission, and innumerable states and cities impose
content-based regulations of varying severity upon the cable media. When
challenged, most of these regulations have been "justified" by the maker, and
sometimes by reviewing courts, on the basis of interests-balancing formulas in the
style of United States v. O'Brien. Under such formulas, facial infringement on
speech freedoms have been determined to be more than off-set by the publicinterest benefits expected to accrue from the restraint. Many lower courts, where
the constitutional issue has been joined, appear confused, especially in deciding
upon the appropriate standard of First Amendment review. This confusion has
resulted in a patchwork of inconsistent and, in some cases, irrational decisions.
The author's position is that O'Brien and its interests-balancing analysis are
inapposite to First Amendment review of any regulation that on its face limits the
exercise of speech or press freedoms. The purpose of the First Amendment is
foremost to insulate expressive activity from the influence of public officials and
thereby to assure an independent press and thus a free society. When reviewing
courts, confronted with deliberate abridgments on communicative freedoms, defer
to the "substantiality" of public-interest findings made by legislative bodies, judges
relinquish their essential role in the tripartite system of constitutionally limited
government; and the constraint of the First Amendment and the freedoms
guaranteed to the people become sham.

The precise level of First Amendment protection due a cable
television operator is clearly an issue of much moment ....
However... we conclude that we again need not resolve this
vexing question.'
I.

FRAMING THE FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTION

When then Chief Judge Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit
* A member of the Bar of the District of Columbia and a partner in the firm of Cole, Raywid
& Braverman, Washington, D.C.; the author has represented cable television interests in various
forums since 1957. The views expressed herein are solely his own.
1. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clarified,
837 F.2d 517 (1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032.
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handed down that court's Century Communications opinion, ruling for the
second time in less than three years that the "must carry" regulations of the
Federal Communications Commission were an unconstitutional abridgment
of cable television operators' First Amendment freedoms, she did so on the
limited ground that the agency had "fail[ed] ...to satisfy even the lessdemanding First Amendment test of United States v. O'Brien."' The
question of whether O'Brien constitutes the appropriate standard by which
such constitutionality is measured is one, she observed, of "much moment"
but also "vexing.'
Other lower courts in the federal system have been wrestling with this
question for nearly thirty years and have run the full gamut of possible
dispositions of the constitutional issue.4 On numerous occasions, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has ruled that its authority to impose
content-based restraints on the publication or distribution of communications
via the cable television media is subject to constitutional review solely under
the O'Brien standard. The agency has concluded in every such instance that
its "public interest" findings more than offset any abridgement of the cable
operator's First Amendment freedoms. 5 To date, the U.S. Supreme Court
2. Id. at 298 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)) ("Must-carry"
regulations required that cable television operators give special priority to the carriage of the
broadcast signals of certain "local" television stations over their closed-circuit distribution
facilities, even to the potential preclusion of other "equally protected" speakers.). The test in
O'Brien is that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct," regulation of the conduct is justified if "it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. See infra notes 45-48.
3. The D.C. Circuit's first encounter with must-carry regulation came in Quincy Cable TV
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986), where, striking down the agency's predecessor version of the rules, it said: "our review
leaves us with serious doubts about the appropriateness of invoking O'Brien's interest-balancing
formulation. ... " There too, however, the court found that because the must-carry rule could
not withstand scrutiny even under the less demanding O'Brien test, it was unnecessary to decide
whether the more exacting standard was the appropriate one. Id.
4. In contrast to the D.C. Circuit's cautious uncertainty, the Seventh Circuit, upholding
communicative regulation by the city of Chicago of the cable television media, has determined
that O'Brien is the proper standard of First Amendment review. Chicago Cable Communications
v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044
(1990). The Tenth Circuit, without reference to O'Brien, has openly urged the proposition that
the cable-television press may be treated differently than the print media where there exists "a
long-standing and powerful tradition that government's hands off is the best way to" uphold the
principles of a free press. Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1001 (1982). The best discussion of the state of the
law is contained in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Preferred Communications v. Los Angeles,
754 F.2d 1396, 1403-11 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986), where
that court took a narrow view of O'Brien's applicability to the central question. As might be
expected, the federal district courts are all over the lot on the issue. See also infra note 133.
5. See, e.g., Effective Competition Standard For the Regulation of Cable Television Basic
Service Rates, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4558 (1991), where the FCC, in one brief paragraph, relies
upon O'Brien to justify rate regulation of services provided by the cable media. See also id. at
4575-76 (separate statement of Chairman Alfred C. Sikes): "Quincy holds that, to pass
constitutional muster as an incidental burden on speech, any must carry rules we devise must
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has declined to speak to the issue definitively The purpose of this article
is to explore this fundamental First Amendment question and to advocate a
position. For the electronic press, including its cable-television component,
represents today the dominant vehicle by which information and opinion, as

are distributed to and accessed by the masses in the
well as entertainment,
7
United States.

The electronic media are at least as crucial to the functioning of
democratic institutions today as were the print periodicals and pamphleteers
of two hundred years ago. The essential difference between 1791, when the
First Amendment was ratified, and today is that the diversity of local,
national, and international information sources and the variety of viewpoints
and outlets have grown astronomically. The most dramatic expansion in the
multiplicity of speakers has transpired over the past fifteen years and is the
direct product of mass media distribution through cable television circuits.
Today the public has instantaneous access to "volumes" of video information

as well as virtually unlimited access to literally tens of thousands of print
publications. For fast-breaking news and opinion, the electronic media, and
in particular its cable television component, serve literally as a window on
the world, not only for the masses but also for governments.' Within the

vindicate some important governmental interest." In both the Quincy and Century Communications cases, the FCC, in support of its content-related regulations, relied solely upon an O'Brien
analysis contending that the must-carry rules served important public-interest goals. According
to the FCC, facial infringements upon "speech" or "press" freedoms, so long as they are
adequately balanced or "vindicate[d]" by some "important governmental interest," constitute a
constitutionally permissible exercise of legislative power. Beginning with In re Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 462 (1962), the FCC established a thirty-year tradition of
summarily rejecting all First Amendment claims by cable television operators either by invoking
its "wide range of discretionary authority [to license radio in the] public interest," id., or by
citing to O'Brien. See infra note 133.
6. In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 495 (1986), the
Court, deferring resolution of the constitutional question put to it in that case, said: "We think
that we may know more than we know now about ... the present uses of the public utility poles
and rights-of-way and how [the cable operator] proposes to install and maintain its facilities on
them." See id. at 496 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (PreferredCommunications "leaves open the
question of the proper standard for judging First Amendment challenges to a municipality's
restriction of access to cable facilities"); Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1443 ("the [Supreme]
Court has never confronted a challenge to the constitutional validity of the must-carry rules or
any other regulation affecting cable television") (footnote omitted). See also United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 181 (1968) (where the Court fi-st entertained the
regulation of cable television and in which it observed that there was "no claim" before it that
the contested governmental action was "in any way constitutionally infirm").
7. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116
(1973) ("The electronic media have swiftly become a major factor in the dissemination of ideas
and information.... To a large extent they share with the printed media the role of keeping
people informed."). A recently published national survey demonstrates that sixty-five percent
of the population relies upon television (including cable television) as its primary source of news
while only forty-two percent referred to newspapers as the primary source. THE ROPER
ORGANIZATION, THE 1989 TIO/RoPER REPORT, 14, 23, 27 (1989).
8. Be it war in the Persian Gulf or a coup in the Kremlin, Cable News Network is the service
that the Government and the people generally turn to for fast-breaking information. See, e.g.,
Howard Kurtz, On Television, Gunfire is Heard, but Not Seen, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1991, at
A-28 ("The official confirmation of what CNN's viewers had been hearing for nearly half an
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context of concentrated ownership or control of mass media interests, there
is today a far greater diversity of information sources coming into the
American home electronically than is the case regarding print publications.9
The United States has entered the Age of Information.
Concurring then in Judge Wald's assessment that the issue of the
appropriate constitutional standard for judicial review of regulations that
impinge on the cable communicator's freedom to publish and to distribute
information to the public is one of "much moment," it is respectfully
suggested that resolution of the question falls far short of "vexing." The
Supreme Court has laid down an unambiguous, well-lit path of precedent
leading to the conclusion that cable television operators, when performing
"communicative" functions, engage in "speech" and constitute a "part of the
press" entitled to that constitutional protection traditionally afforded
publishers, editors, and distributors operating in the other media of mass
communication. 10
The capacity of government under the police powers to supervise, within
hour came at 7:07 p.m. when White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told reporters, 'The
liberation of Kuwait has begun.'"). This of course is not to imply that the electronic press, in
particular its cable television component, is in relevant context superior to the other communications media. As is the case with the print media, the electronic press.traverses the full range
of quality and integrity of journalistic product.
9. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 n.13 (1974). Anyone
in this country over thirty-five years of age, especially those who did not grow up in one of the
two or three very largest metropolitan areas, well recalls the availability of a very limited
number of television channels on the home receiver-generally in the range of two to five
outlets. The nation operated in a three-network dominated video society. For example, in 1969,
Kansas City, Missouri, the twenty-second largest of the nation's 226 television markets, had
three commercial television stations, as did the Buffalo (No. 27), Columbus, Ohio (No. 28), and
Memphis (No. 32) markets. TELEVISION FAcTBOOK No. 40, at 42-a - 44-a (1970). Utica, New
York, ranked as the 130th largest market, had but one commercial television station. Id. at 44a. With the development of cable television services, the number of available channels and
program sources has leaped at least ten-fold, most of which growth has occurred since 1975 with
the advent of satellite-delivered cable networks. Today, there are seventy-six video program
networks offered nationwide for cable distribution. National Cable Television Association,
Cable Television Developments 7-A (1992). More than any other component of the videocommunications complex, cable television is responsible for this dramatic increase in the
diversity of speech sources. Indeed, most of the progress attained to date has been achieved
over the unrelenting objections of the broadcasting industry and the efforts of its friends in both
Congress and the regulatory agencies to place road blocks in the way. See infra notes 123 &
137. While the cable publisher/editor, like those in any medium of mass communication,
exercises control over the selection of infonnation and programming sources, the decisions are
largely dictated by the desires of existing and potential subscribers, virtually all of whom are
attracted to the medium by the abundance of program selection. In no vehicle of mass media
communication is there a greater range of independent speakers and sources than is the case with
the typical cable television offering. Rather than being a gatekeeper, cable television's greatest
contribution to the commonweal lies in the proliferation of programming and the increased
diversity of "speech" sources. It is the dilution in the influence of those few who previously
dominated the home distribution of video programming and commercial messages in the United
States that has led to many of the regulatory restrictions confronted by the cable television
media. An old-fashioned range-war over turf has been in progress since the mid-1960s and
many of those restraints currently proposed for the cable television media are a continuation of
that highly politicized conflict. See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143,
168-176 (1972); 138 Cong. Rec. S654-56 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
10. Cf Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1442 (1991).
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applicable constitutional constraints, the orderly use of its public streets is
generally conceded, even when an "incidental" effect of such regulation may
be to limit the exercise of speech and press freedoms. This of course
recognizes the authority of cities and other local governments appropriately
to oversee the use of public property by private interests who would
permanently install cable television facilities thereon. However, existing and
proposed regulatory measures that facially restrict the discretion of the cabletelevision publisher/editor to implement communicative decisions, including
such matters as "must carry," "access," "retransmission consent," subscriber
rate regulation, exclusivity of intellectual product, "customer service"
standards, and indeed any content-related supervision of the media, raise
serious First Amendment issues. 1 The subject of this constitutional
examination is the ad hoc intrusion of government into that panoply of
activity often characterized as the "editorial process."
The holdings of some lower courts, and the very heart of the First
Amendment question joined here, are perhaps best capsulized by the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable
Commission.12 With respect to content-based regulation of the cable commu-

nications media by the city of Chicago, that court summarily concluded: "As
other [lower] courts have held, O'Brien is an appropriate standard-bearer for
dealing with questions of local regulation of cable television."13 According
to the Seventh Circuit, municipal supervision of the cable television media,
without inquiry into the particular nature or purpose of the regulation, is
subject to a simple, interests-balancing analysis. This concept of lumping all
cable regulations into one neat basket for First Amendment review is the
focus of this article. 14
11. Each of these regulatory measures are contained in S.12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991),
passed by the U.S. Senate in January 1992, 138 Cong. Rec. S760 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1992)
[hereinafter S. 12]. The House of Representatives, where similarly intrusive bills are pending
(e.g., H.R. 1303, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)), had not taken floor action as of the date this
article went to press.
12. Chicago Cable Communications, 879 F.2d at 1548.
13. Id. Chicago Cable Communications involved municipally-imposed requirements that the
cable operator originate a prescribed amount of "locally produced" programming. The court
there was called upon to decide, inter alia, what particular programs fit that description. After
describing the cable operator's First Amendment claim of impermissible content regulation as
raising a novel question, the court proceeded to adopt the district court's finding that O'Brien
provides the framework by which such an issue is determined. Chicago Cable Communications,
879 F.2d at 1547-48. Without discussion, the Seventh Circuit, as did the district court below,
assumed that content-based supervision of the cable television media "'is within the constitutional
power of the Government.'" Id. (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). See also infra notes 37,
38.
14. That a newspaper, for example, is unquestionably subject to local zoning laws or to the
federal antitrust statutes does not open the door to government's regulation of the communicative
or editorial aspects of the publication. The fact that maintenance of newsracks on public
property may require a permit or that such physical occupation might reasonably be supervised,
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), does not provide a bridge to
government's regulation of the content or price of the newspapers dispensed via those newsracks.
Yet some authorities have reasoned that because cable television is subjected to local regulation
when establishing its wire-line complex over and under public rights-of-way, it follows that all
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The protection afforded the editorial process under the Speech and Press
clause of the First Amendment is not determined by the particular means by
which the communicative activity is conducted. 15 If government is constitutionally foreclosed from intruding upon the communicative judgments of
editors in the print media, it likewise is prohibited from proscribing that
segment of the press which opts to publish its speech-product electronically.
That one editor may choose to speak through a particular distribution vehicle
while another communicates via a different technology is a distinction lacking
constitutional significance. 6 Nor does the First Amendment discriminate
between speakers or press organs that originate their own expression and
those who, with appropriate authorization, present or distribute primarily the
speech of others.17 "Communication" and "communicative activity" are
protected from governmental intrusion without reference to the identity of the
communicator or the distribution vehicle of choice. The fact that there
unquestionably has been a tradition of abridging the First Amendment
freedom of the cable television press" is hardly persuasive precedent for
judicial vindication of the unconstitutional governmental action. 9
The "precise level of First Amendment protection due a cable television
operator," again to quote the Century Communications opinion, will
ultimately depend upon the particular standard of judicial review to be
applied by judges adjudicating the constitutionality of content-based
supervision of the medium. The fundamental question is whether public

aspects of the media business must similarly be subject to supervision. See, e.g., Community
Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379 ("[The cable] industry has always been regulated in
many respects. There is no tradition of nearly absolute freedom from government control.").
15. Under the "scarcity doctrine," created by the Supreme Court in the early days of radio
tojustify the Federal Communications Commission's licensing jurisdiction over the broadcasting
media, station licensees have been treated differently in a First Amendment context than have
all others engaged in mass communication. See infra pp. 369-71 and accompanying text and
infra note 173. Some commentators have urged that an identical or similar form of public
interest analysis be applied to the cable television media in evaluating First Amendment claims.
See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1008-10 (2d ed. 1988); Daniel
Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DUKE L.J. 329 (1988).
Ironically, these same constitutional scholars have suggested that modem communications
technology and the plethora of speakers and outlets now available to the public via the electronic
media render the scarcity rationale obsolete in its application to the broadcasting press. See infra
note 95. Scarcity is the sole ground upon which the Court has condoned limited regulatory
abridgment of the First Amendment freedoms of those conferred by the FCC with valuable
broadcast licenses.
16. Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1448 ("the core values of the First Amendment clearly
transcend the particular details of the various vehicles through which the messages are
conveyed").
17. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("the press ... comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 470, 482 (1965) ("the Freedom [of speech] includes not only the right
to utter or to print, but the right to distribute [and] the right to receive"). See also Preferred
Communications, 476 U.S. at 494 (a cable operator "exereis[es] editorial discretion [when
deciding] which stations or programs to include in its repertoire").
18. See supra note 14.
19. See infra note 133.
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officials are to be left relatively free to label their facial abridgements of

speech and press freedoms as promoting "public interest" objectives, and
thereby constitutionally justify their intervention. Or, are deliberate
infringements to be held to a higher standard of scrutiny? The constitutional
issue, which far transcends the bounds of communication via cable television

lines, is whether the First Amendment constitutes in relative terms a
command or an advisory. Is the exercise of discretion by public authority,
whether a legislator, an administrator, or a judge, to play a meaningful role
when the governmental action under review facially conflicts with the express
provisions of the constitutional command?
The thesis developed here is not contingent upon any suggestion that
public-interest judgments made by legislators or regulators are generally, or
even sometimes, rendered in bad faith. For purposes of this article, it is
conceded that the regulatory abridgments of the cable television operator's
speech and press freedom may arguably advance the articulated publicinterest goals. But public-interest projections, however well founded, are
irrelevant to the far more fundamental question of whether the government,
absent some extraordinary or compelling reason, is enabled under the
Constitution to enact laws that are, on their face, speech-proscriptive or
press-restrictive. Decision-makers "must not confuse what is 'good',
'desirable', or 'expedient' with what is constitutionally commanded by the
First Amendment. To do so is to trivialize constitutional adjudication."'
O'Brien's interests-balancing formula is not a device by which the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech or press may be manipulated
to accommodate the preference of the majority or that of the politically
powerful. Nor is O'Brien a tool to circumvent those limits that the
Constitution fixes upon the exercise of governmental power. The author is
not unmindful of the fact that his premise challenges an article of faith long
held by many in the communications establishment as well as in government.
But fundamental constitutional questions ought not to be decided on the basis
of unquestioned assumptions. Dogma, however comforting, is not a
substitute for rational examination.
Judges do a disservice to the principle of an independent communications
media when they even suggest that O'Brien's more lenient standard of First
Amendment review may be the appropriate test for justification of those

20. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13 (1978). The question is not whether contentrestrictive supervision of the cable television "press" may be good public policy but rather
whether the government, under the Constitution, is legally capacitated to make such regulations.
The First Amendment, read in conjunction with Article I, Section 8 and the Tenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, plainly says that it is not. While there undoubtedly are individuals and
groups within the cable television press inflicted with that avarice only too common to the
general business establishment, such societal failings are not a basis for the suspension of
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. See infra note 27.
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regulations that facially abridge the exercise of speech and press liberties.21
That the D.C. Circuit, in both of its must-carry cases, reached the right
result for the wrong reason has served chiefly to compound the confusion
leading other lower courts as well as regulators to apply erroneous,
misleading, and potentially dangerous concepts of constitutional theory.'
More significantly, the suggestion of an O'Brien test to review any contentbased supervision of the press reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the
role of courts when it is the express provisions of the First Amendment that
are directly confronted.'
The following is not so much about communication by cable television
as it is an examination into the role that government and public officials, the
First Amendment notwithstanding, play in the contemporary media of mass
communication in America. This is about the use of political power,
expediency, and the erosion of constitutional principle-a phenomenon that
ought not pass unnoticed.
II. COMMUNICATION BY CABLE TELEVISION IS "SPEECH" AND "PRESS"
WITH ENTITLEMENT TO THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In a case raising a First Amendment challenge to a state excise tax, the
Supreme Court recently said: "Cable television provides to its subscribers
news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the
First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press.'"'

Preferred Communications involved the local franchising of cable television

21. See infra note 46. The O'Brien standard of First Amendment review is the most
overworked, least understood, and most misused constitutional doctrine applied by the lower
courts today. For many judges seemingly believe that its interests-balancing formula is little
more than a roadmap to nullification of the constitutional command that the government "shall
make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." See, e.g., Century
Communications Corp., 835 F.2d at 300, where the D.C. Circuit conducts a protracted
examination of the "substantiality of the governmental interest" regarding the presumptively
unconstitutional rule before it. Some obviously presume the express provisions of the speech
and press clause to carry so little weight when placed on the O'Brien scales as consistently to
be outbalanced by the public-interest visions of legislators or bureaucrats.
22. See, e.g., Chicago Cable Communications, 879 F.2d at 1549, citing both Century
Communications and Quincy for adoption of an O'Brien test to justify the content-based, speechintrusive cable regulations there at issue.
23. f. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 112
S. Ct. 501, 513 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Borrowing the compelling
interest and narrow tailoring analysis is ill-advised when all that is at issue is a content-based
restriction, for resort to the test might be read as a concession that States may censor speech
whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so.").
24. Leathers, I I I S. Ct. at 1442. Although a cable television operator may be something less
than a full-fledged part of the press when, for example, installing or maintaining its electronic
distribution facilities over and under public streets, e.g., Preferred Communications, 476 U.S.
at 495, the cable operator would appear to attain such status when engaged in the process of
making and implementing communicative judgments. While the Supreme Court has hinted
strongly in Preferred Communications that cable television's use of public right-of-way to lay
its cable lines provides a basis for relevant regulation, the Court has never suggested that such
supervision may extend to control over the communicative aspects of the medium.
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systems and the parameters of the First Amendment protection afforded the
media in that context. In that case, the Court observed that cable operators
engage in the "communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of
newspaper and book publishers, public speakers, and pamphleteers," further
explaining that, "through original programming or by exercising editorial
discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, [a
cable-television operator] seeks to communicate messages on a wide variety
of topics and in a wide variety of formats."' While the Court has never
focused directly on the question of what First Amendment protection is due
the cable television press, certainly, when the media engages in communicative functions, those functions are at least presumably immunized from
government restriction.'
The fact that those privileged few conferred by the government with
valuable licenses to use scarce radio frequencies in the conduct of their
commercial broadcasting businesses have been placed by the Court in a
unique category and treated somewhat differently than have the other media
of mass communications, even where First Amendment freedoms are
implicated, is neither overlooked nor discounted.' The Court has never
suggested, however, a mandate of greater responsibility on those who speak
or edit outside of the print media. Nor has the Court implied that the
constraint by which the First Amendment firmly limits the exercise of
governmental power is somehow lifted when the target of the legislature's
restraint is the cable television press.
Those protections constitutionally afforded speakers and the press are not
exclusive to the print media but rather pertain to all who engage in the
process of communicating to the public, whatever the chosen means of
expression or promulgation.'s In Miami Herald, the Court stated that
regulation of an editor's discretion over communicative matters "can[not] be

25. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494. See also supra note 6.
26. See infra pp. 371-75 and accompanying notes.

Even broadcast licensees retain a

substantial degree of their constitutional protection. See infra pp. 369-71.
27. Miami HeraldPub. Co., 418 U.S. at 256. See also id. at 258 ("[R]egulation of [editorial
discretion] can[not] be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press.").
In Miami Herald, Mr. Tomillo in support of the content-based, viewpoint-neutral state statute
there at issue, argued, inter alia, "that government has an obligation to ensure that a wide

variety of views reach the public," id. at 247, and that "national newspapers, national wire and
news services, and one-newspaper towns, are the dominant features of a press that has become
non-competitive and enormously powerful," id. at 249 (footnote omitted). In the face of these

assertions of monopoly power and the suggested affirmative obligation of government to advance
First Amendment "values," the Court held: "However much validity may be found in these

arguments, at each point the implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of access
necessarily calls for some mechanism, either governmental or consensual. If it is governmental
coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First
Amendment . . . " Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).
28. See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 ("The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals ....
The press in its historical connotation comprehends every sort of publication

which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."). See also supra note 16.
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exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees

of a free

press ..... "1 In the context of the broadcasting media, where the authority

of the government through its licensing jurisdiction is relatively more
pervasive, the Court notably has reaffirmed its commitment to the constitutional guarantees of free expression for station licensees finding that were it
to uphold the intrusions advocated in the case before it, there would be a
contradiction of the First Amendment's command.' That same command
is not to be ignored when the communications are distributed to the public
via the medium of cable television lines. In Columbia BroadcastingSystems,
the Court further explained that editors in the print and electronic media
perform essentially identical functions, they exercise dominion over
content." Cable television editors, when making those same judgments,
come within the scope of the First Amendment; and their activities, with rare
exception, are likewise protected from ad hoc regulation of a communicative
character. It is suggested that the constraint and immunities of the First
Amendment retain their potency even when confronted by the legislature's
public-interest findings.
The freedom of "speech" and "of the press" applies equally to the
distribution of another's speech."2 This "freedom ...

includes not only the

right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute [and] the right to
receive. " " While "each method [of expression or distribution] tends to
present its own peculiar problems ....

the basic principles of freedom of

speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. " I
Like their counterparts in the other media of mass communication, cable
television publishers exercise those freedoms uniquely protected from
governmental intrusion under the Speech and Press clause of the First
Amendment. Designed by the Founding Fathers as a restraint on the lawmaking powers of government, the First Amendment structurally limits the
authority of the government to enact regulations intended to abridge the

29. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 418 U.S. at 258.
30. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 120-21. See also id. at 125 ("Calculated risks
of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values. The presence of these risks is nothing
new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality that these risks were evils for which
there was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility-and civility-on the part of those who exercise the guaranteed freedoms of expression.").
31. Id. at 124 ("For better or worse, editing is what editors are for;, and editing is selection
and choice of materials."). See also Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1452, where the D.C.
Circuit found that the FCC's must-carry rules coerce speech but that the "more certain
[constitutional] injury stems from the substantial limitations the rules work on the [cable]
operator's otherwise broad discretion to select the programming it offers its subscribers.").
32. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)) ("Liberty
of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the
circulation, the publication would be of little value.").
33. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
34. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
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freedom of speech or press.3" Because the "press... comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion,"3
the limits constitutionally placed on the powers of government pertain to all
elements of the mass media including cable television.
These time-honored constitutional principles notwithstanding, it is
"speech" and it is "the press," albeit the cable television model, that the
Congress, the FCC, and numerous local governments seek to restrict. An
increasing number of legislators and public officials urge that their perceptions of societal goals furnish a sufficient legal basis upon which to override
the constraint that constitutionally limits their powers. In those purely
communicative areas of product selection and distributionpractices-activities
falling squarely within the traditionally protected sphere of editorial
discretion-it is openly urged that the judgments and mandates of legislators
and government administrators supersede those of the private communicator.37

The theory of those supporting communicative supervision of the cabletelevision press is that government may selectively abridge the freedom of
the cable editor or publisher provided that the results predicted to flow from

the restraint are perceived, on balance, as satisfying a greater public
interest.38 But were the constraint by which the First Amendment limits
governmental action only so firm (or soft) as the elected representative or
bureaucrat of the moment judges it to be, then the freedom of speech and
press, and indeed the very proposition of constitutionally limited government,

35. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 114 (The First Amendment "is a restraint on
government action."). In the Bill of Rights, only the First Amendment is cast as an
unconditional constraint on the law-making powers of the government. While the other nine
Amendments focus largely on the enumerated rights of the people, the First imposes a limitation
on governmental action. The liberty of speech and press as well as that of religion were so
uniquely "protected because [the forefathers] knew of no other way" to guard against the
anticipated intrusion of government. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545-46 (1945) (Jackson,
J., concurring). "The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from
assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press [and] speech .... "
Id. at 545. See also Potter Stewart, Or of the Press,26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) ("Mhe
Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the Constitution.").
36. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452.
37. See, e.g., Chicago Cable Communications, 879 F.2d at 1550-51, where the Seventh
Circuit said: "The City [of Chicago] is not seeking a dominant interest in [the cable operator's]
programming, nor even a substantial interest, but simply a few hours a week." The court of
appeals then found direct intrusion into the programming judgments of the cable operator to be
only a "limited restriction" on First Amendment freedoms and one "really no greater than
essential to further substantial City interests." Id. What if this same scenario ("simply a few
columns a week") were to be applied to The Chicago Tribune?
38. In the view of some, projected public-interest goals can, and often do, offset the
constitutionally inscribed constraint on the government's powers. For example, the court of
appeals in Chicago Cable Communications, found the facial abridgment of First Amendment
freedoms to be permissible provided that it furthers a "substantial [governmental] interest" and
is "no greater than essential" to achieve that end. It is this "end justifies the means" rationale
that is so "wholly foreign" to First Amendment principle. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,4849
(1976). A guaranteed freedom or Bill of Rights that may be counterbalanced (or canceled) by
the assertion of a governmental interest is meaningless.
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become little more than celebratory rhetoric. 9 Any action of government
designed to abridge the freedom of speech or press, whomever the target and
whatever measure of popular support it may enjoy, is at odds with the First
Amendment and, at minimum, presumptively unconstitutional.'
That amorphous concept of "constitutional due process," where often
there is latitude for extrapolation and even sharp disagreement, is not under
examination here. This article is not an attempt to delineate those unenumerated rights that may be encompassed under the penumbra of the
constitutionally recognized "right to privacy"-a question calculated to
provoke school-yard brawling among even our most learned judges and
scholars. The challenge is not to identify those punishments that transcend
the line into the "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the ]Eighth
Amendment.4 ' The issue is, rather, whether regulations made deliberately
to restrict the "communicative" activity of the cable television media abridge
the freedom of speech, or of the press, a point on which there is no
dispute.42 The essential inquiry then is whether public officials, on the
basis of their public interest judgments, are at liberty to evade unequivocal
constitutional command. Do the findings of legislative or administrative
bodies, however prescient, counteract the express provisions of the First

39.

.Columbia BroadcastingSys., 412 U.S. at 133 (Stewart, J., concurring).

The First Amendment prohibits the Government from imposing controls upon the
[electronic] press .... Yet [the court below] held ... that the First Amendment
requires the Government to impose controls upon private broadcasters-in order to
preserve First Amendment "values." The appellate court accomplished this strange
convolution by the simple device of holding that private broadcasters are Government. This is a step along a path that could eventually lead to the proposition that
private newspapers "are" Government. Freedom of the press would then be gone.
In its place we would have such governmental controls upon the press as a majority
of this Court at any particular moment might consider First Amendment "values" to
require. It is a frightening specter.
Id. (footnote omitted).
40. See id. at 145-46 (There are grave "dangers that beset us when we lose sight of the First
Amendment itself, and march forth in blind pursuit of its 'values.' . .. For if those 'values'
mean anything, they should mean at least this: If we must choose whether editorial decisions
are to be made in the free judgment of individual broadcasters, or imposed by bureaucratic fiat,
the choice must be for freedom.").
41. This is not even a question of whether a nativity scene in the public square confronts the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, U.S. CONST., amend. I, or whether the Second
Amendment's "right of the people to keep and bear Arms," U.S. CONST., amend. II,
encompasses the AK-47 assault weapon or other cannon.
42. See, e.g., Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, I
F.C.C.R. 864, 886 (1986), where the FCC candidly "recognize[d that] must carry rules are a
stringent form of regulation that intrude on cable operators' free speech rights." Nonetheless,
the FCC, for yet the third time, proposes a new set of such rules. Carriage of Television
Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545 (1991). And the U.S. Senate
passed such a bill (S.12) on January 31, 1992. 138 Cong. Rec. S760 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1992).
See also supra note 37.
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Amendment?43 May the legislature or its administrative delegee, based on
the "substantiality" of the perceived interest, exceed those powers constitutionally conferred or exercise that authority which the Constitution explicitly
withholds?
It will be shown that constitutional review of content-based regulations,
the facial purpose of which is selectively to abridge the exercise of speech
and press freedoms, whatever the societal goals and however substantial the
governmental interest, contemplates far more than O'Brien's costs/benefits
analysis. At issue here are the basic principles of freedom of speech and the
press, and these fundamental constitutional parameters do not vary merely
because the editor in question elects to communicate through the medium of
cable instead of by print," or because the legislature finds the speechrestrictive law to further a constructive public purpose.
III. THE "INTERESTs-BALANCING" STANDARD OF UNTEL) STATES V.
O'BRIEN IS INAPPOSITE TO CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF ANY
REGULATION THAT FACIALLY CONFRONTS THE ExPREss
PROVISIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

To date, the principal efforts by governmental authorities to justify
content-based regulation of the cable television press involve the four-prong,
interests-balancing formula set forth in United States v. O'Brien." In every
instance where the issue has arisen, it has been the government's position,
sometimes confirmed by reviewing courts, that the restriction acknowledged
to be placed directly upon the cable operator's exercise of speech or press
freedoms is simply outweighed by those societal benefits projected to accrue
from the infringement. But in order even to qualify for an O'Brien analysis,
that most relaxed of all standards by which compliance with the First
Amendment is measured, the threshold requirement is that the contested
regulation be on its face "within the constitutional power of the Government."4

43. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ("Mere legislative preferences
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of [First
Amendment] rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.").
44. Joseph Bursnyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 503.
45. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to furtherance of that interest.").
46. Id. That the O'Brien standard is typically characterized by the Court as "less stringent,"
"relatively lenient," or "less demanding" (as in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403, 407
(1989)), is only because it is inapposite to review of regulations that facially proscribe
communicative activity. The very predicate of O'Brien, as articulated by the Court, is that the
draft-card law there at issue "plainly [did] not abridge free speech on its face.... [Such law]
on its face deals with conduct having no connection with speech." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375.
Compare O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375 ("A law prohibiting destruction of Selective Service
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In contrast to the draft card law under consideration in O'Brien, contentbased regulation of the cable television media facially confronts the express
provisions of the First Amendment. The target of the legislature is the cable
"press" and the regulatory objective is to limit the "speech" freedom of those
who publish via that vehicle of expression. Within the framework of government's constitutional powers, the authority to place content-related restrictions on the media of mass communication may hardly be equated or
analogized to that of raising an army. 7 Where the regulation of the
communications media is at issue, the Constitution bars the government from
making laws that abridge the exercise of the freedom of speech or press."
That a law having a concededly or presumptively constitutional purpose
(such as making it a crime to knowingly destroy or mutilate one's draft
card),49 and a regulation which facially conflicts with the First Amendment
(such as placing content-related restrictions on the exercise of a private
editor's discretion),' are not subject to the same, or even similar, First
Amendment analysis, would seem but elementary. 5' While the former is
frequently justified pursuant to a relatively forgiving balancing test (in which
unspecified public-interest factors are subjectively weighted), the latter must

certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the
destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and records.")
with Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 ("If the. .. regulation is not related to expression then the less
stringent standard we announced in United States v. O'Brien for regulation of noncommunicative
conduct controls. [Otherwise, we must apply] a more demanding standard."). Only after the
law under challenge is found on its face to be "within the constitutional power of the Government" does O'Brien's interests-balancing exercise proceed to consider the remaining three
criteria. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. When the law at issue presumably exceeds "the
constitutional power of the Government," id., the O'Brien process is forthwith terminated and
the more demanding standard is mandated.
47. C. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support
armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping."); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 13-14 ("The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well
established.").
48. O'Brien weighs the legitimate governmental interest furthered by the presumptively
constitutional law at issue vis-a-vis any limitation that the law's enforcement might incidentally
occasion to the complainant's alleged rights of expression or distribution. O'Brien is inapposite
to review of any law that facially poses a question of its constitutionality. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
at 377. When government acts purposefully and selectively to abridge "press" freedoms, cites
to O'Brien and thereby summarily forecloses examination of its capacity under the Constitution
to promulgate the speech-intrusive law, as in Chicago Cable Communications, 879 F.2d at 155051, the First Amendment is made a nonentity.
49. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375.
50. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 418 U.S. 241.
51. Compare, e.g., Tornillo v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1973) (where
the State's highest court, faced with the viewpoint-neutral, content-based law there at issue,
applied considerations of "broad societal interest in the free flow of information to the public"
to find the access regulation constitutional) with Miami Herald Pub. Co., 418 U.S. at 258
(where the Supreme Court, reversing without so much as an allusion to societal interest or
principles of rationality, held the Florida law to facially offend the First and Fourteenth
Amendments). The Court never found it necessary, or even appropriate, to venture into the
morass of whether Florida's regulation of the press was intended to advance societal goals.
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undergo strict scrutiny.52 If O'Brien is not an appropriate standard by
which to gauge the constitutionality of a regulation abridging the freedom of
a newspaper editor to make journalistic decisions, it is no less inappropriate
because the editor in question happens to labor in the medium of electronic
communication.53 To contend that a law designed to restrain the freedom
of speech and press, and one intended only to supervise noncommunicative
conduct (but which, when enforced in a particular circumstance, is alleged
incidentally to limit speech freedoms), are subject to the same deferential
examination not only ignores O'Brien and the extensive body of law
developed thereunder, but also loses sight of the First Amendment itself.'
Communicative supervision of the cable television press is not challenged
on the ground that enforcement of a presumptively constitutional law
"incidentally" limits the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Rather,
such supervision is challenged because it selectively and deliberately abridges
the cable operator's freedom of speech and therefore facially confronts the
constitutional command.5' Whatever factual question may prevail as to the

52. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1988) (content-based, viewpoint-neutral
regulation subject to exacting scrutiny). Note, for example, that the FCC's must-carry proposal,
the very purpose of which is to confer a cable-distribution preference on the speech of certain
licensees of television broadcast stations, can hardly be characterized as neutral. See also
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (The "concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."). A must-carry regime not only restrains the First Amendment freedom of the
cable operator/editor, it also abridges the rights of those other equally protected speakers who
may adversely be affected by the preferential treatment accorded the broadcast-licensee speaker.
See Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1451-52.
53. The "basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's
command, do not vary." Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 503. The government would never
assert, for example, that it has the authority to regulate the subscription or commercial
advertising rates charged by print periodicals in one-newspaper towns subject only to a
satisfactory O'Brien examination. Nor would government act selectively to impose morestringent "customer service" standards on newspapers or book-stores than were applied to the
general business community. Yet, the Congress and the FCC assume such powers where it is
the cable television press that is involved. With the exception of blatant censorship, nothing
goes more directly to content than does the authority selectively to impose costs or to control
revenues.
54. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-19. If money is "speech" then manifestly the communicative
judgments of a cable editor are speech. See id. at 17 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382)
("Unlike O'Brien, where the Selective Service System's administrative interest in the
preservation of draft cards was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of communication, it
is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged conduct of giving or spending money
'arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself
thought to be harmful.'").
55. While government is constitutionally foreclosed from regulating of speech or press, there
is no limit on making laws which have an incidental effect on speech. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 377 ("to raise and support armies"); Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984) (to maintain order in public places); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (to abate a public nuisance by "control[ing] noise" levels); United States
v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (to maintain security on military bases through enforcement of "trespass" laws); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
805, 809 (1984) (to reduce "visual clutter") ("It is well settled that the state may legitimately
exercise its police power to advance aesthetic values."); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707
(1977) (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)) (to prohibit one from

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

15

California Western Law Review, Vol. 28 [1991], No. 2, Art. 7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

degree or the wisdom of the government's restraint, there can be no question
that the intent is to proscribe the exercise of the constitutionally protected
freedom. -'
The undisguised regulatory purpose of content-based regulation of the
cable media is to restrain one component of the private press. 7 Instead of
supervising a nonspeech element of the cable operator's conduct, the
governmental interest lies in suppressing the operator's exercise of editorial
discretion. 8 Instead of accidentally or incidentally affecting speech,
abridgement of that freedom is the raison d'etre of the regulation. 9 The
"knowingly [obscuring] . . . the figures or letters on any [automobile license] plate"). The
critical distinction between those laws at bar in the foregoing cases (and indeed in all of those
cases where the Court, confronting First Amendment claims, has applied a simple balancing
test), and those laws selectively restricting the cable television media, is that the former do not
target the press or even implicate communicative activity. In every case where O'Brien's lessdemanding test is properly the standard of First Amendment review, the law under examination
is facially and presumptively constitutional. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456,
2460 (1991) (Indiana "has not banned nude dancing as such, but has proscribed public nudity
across the board."); id. at 2463-67 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Public nudity is not a right protected
under the First Amendment and therefore the argument presented does not give rise to a
constitutional question.).
56. Compare Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 496 ("Where a law is subjected to a
colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will sustain legislation against
other constitutional challenges typically does not have the same controlling force.") with City
of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 755-57; id. at 774-75 (White, J., joined by Stevens and
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (facial challenge appropriate only when conduct sought to be
regulated is explicitly protected by First Amendment). In City of Lakewood, the dispute between
the justices was confined to the "'technical' question: What is the scope of the peculiar doctrine
that governs facial challenges to local laws in the First Amendment area?" Id. at 773
('White, J.,dissenting). In contesting the majority's more expansive view, the dissent then
urged: "The doctrine ... applies only when the specific conduct which the locality seeks to
license is protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 774. There is no question that the making
of communicative judgments by a cable television editor is activity specifically protected under
the First Amendment. Thus, whether one follows the rationale of the majority or the minority
in City of Lakewood, content-based regulation of the cable television "press" is subject to facial
challenge.
57. C). O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("On the assumption that the alleged communicative element
in [Mr.] O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected
activity."). With regard to communicative regulation of the cable television media, there is no
question that (I) the First Amendment applies, and (2) the activity targeted by the contested
regulation is constitutionally protected. Thus, while burning one's draft card, or dancing in the
nude, may well not be "speech," communication by cable television unquestionably is. It is also
to a very large extent "press." Leathers, 111 S.Ct. at 1442.
58. Cf. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904))
(balancing test inapposite "because the inevitable effect-the 'necessary scope and operation' [of
the law at issue]-abridged constitutional rights"). See also Vincent, 466 U.S. at 809 (quoting
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160-61) ("Prohibition of [noncommunicative] conduct would not abridge
the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to
speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion."). Here, the liberty facially abridged
is the cable operator's discretion to speak, to publish and to distribute protected communications
free of governmental intrusion.
59. How, we ask, may a press-specific, speech-restrictive regulation crafted expressly to
abridge communicative activity be said to limit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms only
incidentally? See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1142
(1976) (defining "incidental" as "subordinate, nonessential, or attendant in position or calculation . . ."). "Incidental" is not a synonym for "small" or "modest." See also Quincy Cable
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overwhelming presumption is therefore one of unconstitutionality. Yet, the
proponents of communicative regulation of the cable television press insist
that the facial disregard of the First Amendment is benign because, in their
view, it is calculated to produce results in the public interest.
O'Brien is not a talisman by which the government may make facially
unconstitutional laws constitutional As the O'Brien Court so pointedly

recognized, "both the governmental interest and the 1965 [draft-card law] are
limited to the noncommunicative aspect of [Mr.] O'Brien's conduct. " 60 Yet
O'Brien is invoked by public officials and some courts to constitutionally
justify regulations that purposefully abridge the cable communicator's
freedom of expression.61 So used, O'Brien's relatively lenient test becomes
an instrument for repeal of the First Amendment.62
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,' the Supreme
Court said: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. " ' 4 Nowhere are these words more potent than
with regard to the "certain subjects" of speech and press. The freedom to
engage in these activities, as guaranteed to the people, has constitutionally
been placed "beyond the reach of majorities and officials."' For the First
Amendment occupies a "preferred place" in the scheme of government.1
If this principle is to mean anything, it is that the people's exercise of these

TV, 768 F.2d at 1450-52.
60. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82.
61. The analytical shortcoming in the Century Communications opinion is the court's
preoccupation with the FCC's findings below. Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 293-304.
Must-cary was not unconstitutional because five FCC commissioners collectively saw too much
public benefit in those regulations and, thus, misread the O'Brien scales. Id. at 304. The
constitutional transgression occurred at the instant the agency concocted rules the purpose and
effect of which was to abridge the "speech" and "press" freedoms not only of the cable
television operator but also other equally protected speakers-an action that facially exceeded
its powers. The court of appeals, though ultimately viewing the substantiality of the landscape
differently, went down that same dark path as did the FCC where all sight of the First
Amendment's command was quickly lost. Id. at 300.
62. Were content-based regulations of the type considered here to be applied contextually to
the print media (or more selectively to "faxed" newsletters), no one would in good faith contend
that O'Brien is the appropriate standard for constitutional review. See, e.g., Quincy Cable T1,
768 F.2d at 1452 n.37. Yet, where cable is the medium of expression, freedoms now taken for
granted by editors in the other media of mass communication as well as by the courts (e.g.,
editorial discretion to determine the content, packaging and pricing of communicative product)
are said to be subject to governmental restraint. The proponents of such disparate regulation of
the "press" make no effort to justify, nor do they even recognize, the patent lack of neutrality
in the application of fundamental constitutional principles. Without discussion, they simply
assume that the constitutional question is subsumed by public interest considerations.
63. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
64. Id. at 638.
65. If, because of the First Amendment, "majorities and officials" may not "reach" speech
and press, how then, we ask, may those same majorities and officials enter those crucial publicinterest findings pursuant to which the once protected activities are returned to their jurisdiction?
66. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530.
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uniquely protected freedoms must not be subjected to the mood swings of
politics or administrative discretion. The public interest, however appropriate that standard may be in other contexts, such as the federal licensing of
radio frequencies67 is not a narcotic generally dulling the protection
constitutionally given the activities of speech or press. Nor does a public
interest finding, however ingenious, nullify the constraint by which the
exercise of governmental power is constitutionally limited.'
Above all, the First Amendment bars legislative intrusion. 6 Yet those
types of regulations under examination, each enacted or proposed pursuant
to the legislative powers of government, would intimately supervise the
communicative aspects of the cable television media.' This contravention
of the First Amendment's command is simply glossed over with invocation
of an interests-balancing test and the official proclamation of ample publicinterest rewards. The fundamental error committed by those who would
apply O'Brien to constitutionally justify content-based regulation of the cable
television media is the threshold failure to distinguish between laws that on
their face implicate speech or press freedoms and those that do not.71
O'Brien's interests-balancing standard, of course, has its proper place in
constitutional jurisprudence. Appropriately applied, courts can, but seldom
do, find actionable infractions of First Amendment freedoms incidentally
resulting from enforcement of otherwise constitutionally compliant laws.'
O'Brien's less demanding test is misused, however, when applied for the
purpose of constitutionally validating a regulation that on its face contradicts

67. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(r), 309 (1988).
68. The concept that the political majority may make laws facially abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press merely by finding that the societal purpose of the conflicting regulation
is weightier than is the constraint by which the First Amendment limits its powers is absurd.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
69. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. That the legislature may acquiesce in, or even mandate, the intrusion
is thus not a factor in weighing the constitutionality of the government's action. Sable
Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) (quoting Landmark
Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)) ("Deference to a legislative finding
cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake."). See also Thomas,
323 U.S. at 530 ("IThe usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred
place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the
First Amendment."). See also infra note 151.
70. See, e.g., Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) ("Government has
legitimate interests in controlling the noncommunicative aspects of the medium..., but the
First and Fourteenth Amendments foreclose a similar interest in controlling the communicative
aspects.").
71. Some authorities are of the mind that if the government's objective is in the public
interest, the means employed to achieve that end, even though they conflict with the express
provisions of the First Amendment, are "incidental." O'Brien's function, however, is to assure
an appropriate hearing to those claiming abridgment of their freedom of expression as the
incidental result of the enforcement of a facially constitutional law. Rather than constricting
speech freedoms, O'Brien expands the protection to include, or at least to consider, conduct such
as symbolic speech. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
72. For example, of those seven cases cited supra note 55, only Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
finds an actionable infringement of "speech" freedoms.
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the command of the First Amendment. Where it is the deliberate abridgment
of communicative activity that is under review, strict scrutiny is necessarily
the standard.
IV.

CONTENT-RELATED REGULATION OF THE CABLE TELEVISION

"PREsS" DOES NOT FIT UNDER ANY OF THE COURT ESTABLISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES OR ExCEPTIONS THAT MAY jUSTIFY SOME
DIMINISHMENT IN FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION

If, as courts hold and the First Amendment says, government is
foreclosed from making any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, how then may the legislature enable itself to make those very laws?
The answer to this question is that specific, carefully delineated exceptions
to the constitutional rule have evolved through Supreme Court precedent.
Although relatively rare, there are conditions under which the command of
the First Amendment is subject to a test of rationality. Thus the protection
constitutionally afforded speech and press, though comprehensive, is in no
sense absolute.
Generally, laws and governmental actions that facially restrict the
exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, but which nonetheless have
been adjudged constitutional, have some asserted relationship to national
security or public safety. Such measures more often result from war-like
conditions, either hot or cold, where the infringement on the freedom of
select individuals is held necessary to assure the security of society as a
whole.' In other circumstances, restrictions on the individual's exercise of
a First Amendment freedom have been justified to preserve an equally

fundamental right held by others.
Proponents of speech restrictive regulation of the cable media have never
asserted national security as a consideration.74 Nor have they presented any

73. The most unrestrained example of expediency and compromise of the individual's
freedom, at least in the past fifty years, was the World War II mass internment of American
citizens of Japanese descent into concentration camps. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). See also those World War II cases cited infra note 76.
74. Cf., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Note, however, that
John C. Danforth, U.S. Senator from Missouri and then chairman of the Senate committee
having jurisdiction over the FCC, advised in a fourteen-page, single-spaced letter to the FCC
Chairman that: "Few communications issues have attracted as much attention in Congress, or
are as important to society, as the Federal Communications Commission's 'must carry'
proceeding." Letter from Senator John C. Danforth to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC
(July 22, 1986) (FCC Docket No. 85-349). See also joint letter from the leadership and the
overwhelming majority of the members of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce to
Chairman, FCC (June 26, 1987) in which the agency was informed: "we believe it is imperative
that the FCC take final action on the must-carry issue by August 7, 1986 and we fully expect
the Commission to act no later than this date." (FCC Docket No. 85-349). Needless to say the
"independent" regulatory agency acted precisely on August 7, 1986 to adopt those. must-carry
rules ultimately declared unconstitutional by the D.C. Circuit. Carriage of TV Signals by Cable
Television Systems, I F.C.C.R. 864 (1986), rev'd, Century Communications, 835 F.2d 292.
More than anything else, these excesses reflect the political clout of the broadcasting industry.
See infra notes 123, 137. There have now been no must-carry rules since 1985 and society
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claim of a "compelling governmental interest."' They do not suggest that
the speech at issue "create[s] a clear and present danger," or that the republic
or any of its institutions are in "grave and immediate danger" and, but for
the compromise of First Amendment liberties, may topple.76 The "speech"
in question does not fall under any known categorization doctrine (e.g.,
"obscenity" or even "indecency," "fighting words," "time, place and
manner," or "false and misleading") holding a lesser entitlement to the
protection of the First Amendment.'
To the contrary, the particular
communications as well as the communicative activity under consideration
are, so far as it is known, fully protected "speech" and "press."
The instant circumstances implicate no potentially countervailing or "coequal" constitutional interest that might justify some diminishment in the
freedom of speech. 78 Cable television regulation does not, for example,
involve the tension between free speech and the long-standing common law
remedy of a private action for libel to vindicate fundamental personal
rights.79 Nor has there been any suggestion that regulation of the cable
television media is intended to prevent a "noxious use" of property or to
control a "public nuisance," restrictions that in other contexts have been
upheld even though they may impinge on generally recognized constitutional
rights.o

appears to have survived the oversight. Upwards of ninety-five percent of local television
broadcast stations are carried by cable television systems. See, e.g., Comments of Federal Trade
Commission, filed November 26, 1991 in FCC MM Docket 90-4. The constitutional question
has never been one of whether local stations should be carried but rather whether the
government, consistent with the First Amendment, may mandate the preferential treatment of
select speakers-especially those already privileged to use scarce radio frequencies.
75. Cf., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (The Court sustained on a
First Amendment challenge, a confidentiality agreement entered into between the government
and a CIA agent as a condition of employment on the ground that "Government has a compelling
interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security
and . .. so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."); Sable
Conmunications, 492 U.S. at 126 ("[G]overnment may regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest.").
76. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.). See also Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
77. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742-43 (1978); Home Box Office v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 48 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, I11 S.Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991) ("Few, if any,
interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by 'impartial'
jurors."). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
80. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (involving municipal
restrictions on operation of a brickyard); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878)
(involving the banning of an animal rendering plant from residential areas). Both cases consider
claims of an uncompensated "taking" under the Fifth Amendment where a preexisting businessuse was significantly curtailed by regulation, and where the Court found no right to compensation. While there are innumerable contextual differences between making bricks or rendering
animals and the distribution of speech, one decisional distinction is that the former activities are
not constitutionally protected and the latter is. See infra note 146 and cases cited therein. The
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For all of its faults and aggravations, cable television neither pollutes the
environment nor harms any person in a manner that mobilizes the overriding
right of society, the First Amendment notwithstanding, to restrict communicative activity. As Justice Kennedy, so incisively summing up the foregoing
principles of constitutional jurisprudence, recently said:
[Where] a law is directed to speech alone [and] where the speech in
question is not obscene, not defamatory, not words tantamount to an
act otherwise criminal, not an impairment of some other constitutional right, not an incitement to lawless action, and not calculated
or likely to bring about imminent harm [such law exceeds the]
substantive power [of the Government and is presumptively
unconstitutional] .8
Assessed under these established constitutional standards, content-based
restrictions selectively imposed upon the cable television press are, in their
very best light, presumptively unconstitutional.
The cable operator advances the First Amendment neither as a shield nor
as a sword whereby an exception from, or special privilege under, the
generally applicable laws is asserted.' The challenge to regulation of the
cable television media does not present a circumstance where the First
Amendment is alleged to insulate the press from the sweep of general

legislature may not label "speech" and "press" activity as antisocial and thereby do away with
the First Amendment.
81. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. Cf. Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595, 1599-1606 (1990) (those engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, while
guarded against selective regulation, are not by virtue of such pursuits placed beyond the reach
of those laws universally governing society). At issue in Employment Division was the
contention "that [respondents'] religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the
reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is
concededly constitutional as applied to others who use the drug for other reasons." Id. at 1599.
Reasoning that "we have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse ... compliance
with an otherwise valid law," id. at 1600, and rejecting the application of any rationality test
as the appropriate measure of constitutionality, id. at 1603-04, the Court upheld the application
of the criminal law banning the use of peyote. There were three separate opinions rendered in
this case, Scalia, J. for the Court, O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, partially joined
by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., without concurring in the judgment, id. at 1606, and
Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting, id. at 1615. The lone principle
upon which all nine justices concur is that had the State's ban on the use of peyote been
religious-specific, it would have been unconstitutional as a facial abridgment of a First
Amendment freedom. See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-83 (1972) (laws that
target only the press are not constitutionally comparable to those that impose obligations shared
by all citizens, including a reporter's duty to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer
questions even though such inquiry may intrude upon "press" activity); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) ("The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity
from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others.").
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business regulations such as the antitrust laws.' No "speaker's immunity"
from the universal application of, for example, Fair Labor Standards
legislation is claimed.' Nor is there urged any special accommodation
within the criminal laws under the Free Exercise Clause.'
The exercise of "speech" or "press" freedoms comprehends no
prerogative to impair the rights or freedoms of other persons. While these
particular freedoms are specially preserved, there are no elite under the
Constitution, not even the press. In the celebrated Montesquieu's classic
definition set forth nearly 250 years ago: "Liberty is a right of doing
whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he
would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would
have the same power."' Cable operators, when claiming title to those
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, act not to invade or diminish
the lawful rights of others but only to implement their own. They seek to
secure their constitutionally guaranteed right to edit and to distribute speech
free of governmental intimidation."
The laws considered here are solely those intended to curb the communicative activity of one component of the press."5 Only these unique regulatory measures, from which the general community (including other competitive
83. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). A favorite and frequently misused
precedent for those supporting content-based regulation of the press is the Associated Press case.
See, e.g., Effective Competition Standard For the Regulation of Cable Television Basic Service,
6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4558 n.78 (1991). But citing Associated Press for the preposition that facial
abridgment of expressive activity is permissible provided only that the restraint predictably may
contribute to the commonweal is a gross departure from the facts and holding of that case.
Associated Press holds only that the "press" is subject to those laws generally applicable to
business and that it has no special license under the First Amendment to engage in conduct
barred to all others. The case is inapposite to constitutional review of any press-specific or
content-based regulation of speech. See also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,
604 (1981) (FCC has no affirmative First Amendment power to protect "listeners" through
restricting the freedoms of broadcast licensees). See also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S.
Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) ("Generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
report the news.").
84. E.g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 194 (1946). Compare, e.g.,
Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (upholding application of antitrust
laws to the press) with Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (striking as
unconstitutional a license tax specially applied to the press). See also Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
85. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
86. 11 CHARLES MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPIRIT DES LoIS 3 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1899)
(1748).
87. In short, cable operators, like "print" publishers and other mass communicators, are no
better and likely no worse than the general populace. In the context of those laws universally
governing society, they assert no privileged or superior position vis-a-vis the ordinary people.
All that is claimed is that the government is foreclosed by the First Amendment from selectively
restricting their "press" endeavors.
88. Compare Leathers, II I S. Ct. 1438 (holding "generally applicable" state excise tax
constitutional even though selectively applied to different components of the communications
media) with Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (holding unconstitutional a state tax specially applied to the
press).
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press organs) is exempt, are at issue." Rather than urging exception from
any law of general applicability, the objection made to content-related
regulation of the cable television media is one directed to restraints aimed
exclusively at those who distribute constitutionally protected speech via that
medium of expression. When it is the cable press that is consciously "targeted... in a purposeful attempt to interfere with its First Amendment
activities," the law is presumptively, if not conclusively, unconstitutional,'
If the guarantee of the First Amendment is to have credence, then the
press, especially a particular sub-class thereof, may not be singled out for
imposition of disparate, content-related regulatory burdens. 9
Selective
suppression of the media of mass communications by government, whatever
the rationale, cannot constitutionally be justified through an imprecise

balancing exercise where miscellaneous public-interest factors are subjectively weighted.'
The FCC does not license the establishment of cable television systems.
Accordingly, there has been no suggestion that locally franchised cable
television operations are subject to that agency's radio-licensing standard of
"public interest, convenience and necessity,"'e pursuant to which it allocates

89. Cf. MinneapolisStar & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 592-93 ("A tax that singles out the press
or that targets individual publications within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to
justify its action."). Here, we are concerned with censorial restrictions on a single component
of the press, something far more confrontational in a First Amendment context than is a subtle,
or even a burdensome, tax. Cf. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444 (rejecting constitutional claims on
ground that "Arkansas has [not] targeted cable television in a purposeful attempt to interfere with
its First Amendment activities").
90. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444. See also Simon & Schuster, 501 S. Ct. at 508. ("A statute
is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on
speakers because of the content of their speech ....
Mhe Government's ability to impose
content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.").
91. See, e.g., New York 7imes Co., 403 U.S. at 730-31 (White, J., concurring) (The "press"
is entitled to perhaps even greater First Amendment protection than the individual and it is only
the most extraordinary reason that might justify a prior restraint.). While the government has
asserted a variety of public interest justifications for its admittedly speech-intrusive regulations,
it has never confronted the fact that the regime is principally one of supervising the cable
television "press" through a system of content-based prior restraints. See also Gentile, 111 S.
Ct. at 2748 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Whatever "speech" restrictions may properly be placed
on an attorney in the performance of duty as an officer of the court is not precedent for
restriction on the "press.").
92. Any interests-balancing test, especially one so undisciplined as to be characterized by the
Court as "relatively lenient" or "less demanding," supra note 46, is often little more than a
euphemism for the exercise of discretion. The First Amendment manifestly imposes a more
strict scrutiny when, as here, the regulations under consideration squarely confront the
constitutional command. In those cases where O'Brien's formula has been applied by the Court,
the preponderance of decisions is to sustain the law under examination. This primarily is
because such laws are on their face constitutional and therefore presumptively lawful. The
government's burden is materially different, and far more difficult, when the regulation under
review is presumptively unconstitutional.
93. 47 U.S.C.S. § 309(a) (Law. Co-op. 1981).
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the private use of radio frequencies.' Neither is communication by cable
television subject to the "scarcity doctrine" pursuant to which the federal
licensing agency has been permitted to impose limited public-interest
obligations upon those privileged few it authorizes to utilize the scarce
broadcasting spectrum, even when First Amendment interests are implicated.95 While the "broadcast licensee has a large measure of journalistic
freedom [it is] not as large as that exercised by a newspaper."' Nevertheless, the FCC in its regulation of the broadcast media "must oversee without
censoring, " 97 and any supervision of "speech" is constitutionally limited to
the "evaluation of [the licensee's] overall performance under the [statutory]
public interest standard."" Any mandated "right-of-access" or "means...
of favoring access by [some over others]," even under the more forgiving
scheme of broadcast regulation, would create substantial First Amendment
problems. 9'
With respect to the FCC's regulation of the broadcasting media, the
Supreme Court has explained "that although [the Communications Act]
prohibits the Commission from editing proposed broadcasts in advance, it
94. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978).
However broad may be the FCC's discretion to make rules implementing its public-interest
jurisdiction over the licensing of radio broadcast frequencies, the placing of content-based
restrictions on the cable television media is not licensing. Nor do such restraints relate to the
orderly use of the radio spectrum.
95. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17, 226-27 (1943);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969); Columbia BroadcastingSys.,
412 U.S. at 101-11. The scarcity doctrine is uniquely confined to the process followed by the
FCC in the licensing of broadcast stations under the Communications Act of 1934 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988)). "Without government control, the medium [of radio]
would be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be
clearly and predictably heard." Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 376 (footnote omitted).
See also Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1449 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at
389) ("[Q]uite independent of the objective of bringing communicative order to the otherwise
chaotic airwaves, the First Amendment tolerates a modest degree of government oversight of

broadcast radio and television because such regulation assures that broadcasters, privileged
occupants of a physically scarce resource, act in a manner consistent with their status as
fiduciaries of the public's interest in responsible use of the spectrum."). The Supreme Court
consistently has recognized the narrowness of the scarcity doctrine even in its unique application
to the federal licensing of the broadcasting media. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at
105-10; Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750. See Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 74 (1983) ("Our decisions have recognized that the special interests of the Federal
Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a justification
for regulation of other means of communication.") (footnote omitted); Quincy Cable TV, 768
F.2d at 1449 ("the 'scarcity rationale' has no place in evaluating government regulation of cable
television"). See also TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1005-06 ("reconsideration [of the scarcity
rationale] seems long overdue"); Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1, 221-26 (1982) (with the advent of cable and satellite services
and the multiplicity of video programming sources now available to the public, the "scarcity"
rationale is obsolete).
96. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 117.
97. Id.at 118.
98. Id. at 120. See also id. at 126 ("Although the use of a [scarce] public resource...
permits a limited degree of Government surveillance. . ., the Government's power over
licensees . . . is by no means absolute.") (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 127.
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does not preclude subsequent review of [a licensee's] program content." 100
In the case of cable regulation, whether it, for example, be rate regulation
or must carry, the content-based order is prospective in application (i.e., a
restraint on distribution of constitutionally protected communications unless
the cable publisher defers to the government's restrictive condition) as well
as being one that is wholly unrelated to any licensing review.10 ' The
public-interest findings of legislative and regulatory bodies, it is said, obviate
the need for rational discourse on the constitutional question."°
V. CABLE OPERATORS Do NOT RELINQUISH THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOMS IN EXCHANGE FOR GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE THEIR COMMUNICATIONS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

At least two federal circuit courts have held that when a cable television
operator and a local governmental entity reach agreement upon the terms and
conditions of a franchise permitting installation of the private cablecommunications complex over the public right-of-way, the operator, either
as a matter of law or as part of the negotiating process, surrenders or waives

100. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 597 n.38. The Court's discussion in WNCN was
related to its prior opinion in Pacifica Foundation, the case generally acknowledged to represent
the outer limits of content-based regulation of broadcast stations by the FCC in the exercise of
its radio licensing jurisdiction. But see New York ines Co., 403 U.S. at 730-32 (White, J.
concurring) (while the press enjoys "extraordinary protection against prior restraints" and while
the government undertakes a "very heavy burden," there may be "express and appropriately
limited congressional authorization for prior restraints").
101. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co., 418 U.S. at 256 ("The Florida [access] statute
operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding [the publication
of] specified matter. Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or
traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers."). See
also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 64 (1976) (quoting Police Dept. of
the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)) ("The essence of ... forbidden
censorship is content control."). The content-related decisions of a cable television publisher
are no more, and no less, entitled to the protection of the First Amendment than are those of an
editor of The New York Times, the National Broadcasting Network or the National Enquirer.
If Senate Bill S.12, as passed by that body on January 31, 1992, is any measure of
government's constitutional capacity to supervise the cable television press, then there are
virtually no limits to the legislature's power. For S.12 can withstand First Amendment scrutiny
only if it is determined that public officials, where it is the cable press that is targeted, hold
carte blanche to restrict whatever speech activity is deemed to serve the public's interest. S. 12
is significantly more intrusive than even that regulation of the broadcasting media found
impermissible under the scarcity doctrine. The constitutional question therefore is whether it
is open season on the cable television press, the First Amendment notwithstanding.
102. Even under the scarcity doctrine-that most permissive and limited of all First
Amendment tests-the Court has made it clear that while the broadcast "licensee is ... held
accountable for the totality of its performance of public interest obligations," it retains its day-today "journalistic independence."
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 121. "That
editors-newspaper or broadcast--can and do abuse [their editorial] power is beyond doubt, but
that is no reason to deny the discretion. . . ." Id. at 124.
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certain of its First Amendment freedoms." The necessary corollary of
this novel proposition is that the public franchising authority to whom the
constitutional rights are surrendered is enabled thereby to do that which the
First Amendment forbids, namely to abridge the cable operator's now
unprotected freedom of speech and press.
Over the past century, however, the Supreme Court consistently has
condemned as unconstitutional all efforts by government to condition its
favor upon the relinquishment or surrender of a constitutionally guaranteed
right."°G In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Commission of California,1 5 the Court said:
The naked
may ...

question..,

therefore,

is whether

the state

impos[e] the unconstitutional requirement as a condition

precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege, which, without so
deciding, we shall assume to be within the power of the state
altogether to withhold if it sees fit to do so. Upon the answer to
this question, the constitutionality of the statute now under review
will depend ....
•..

In reality, [such choice is] no choice, except a choice between

the rock and the whirlpool ....
...

It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a

general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether,
may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But 'the
power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the
limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the
relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States
may thus be manipulated out of existence. 1"
Reaffirming this proposition in the case of Perry v. Sindermann, ° the

103. See Paragould Cablevision v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991)
("By entering into the franchise agreement [the cable television operator] effectively bargained
away some of its free speech rights ... [and] cannot now invoke the First Amendment to
recapture surrendered rights."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 430; Erie Telecommunications v. City
of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3rd Cir. 1988) (finding "a valid contractual waiver" of future
First Amendment claims).
104. The general rule was first stated by the Supreme Court in Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 456 (1874). See also Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186, 197 (1887).
105. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
106. Id. at 592-94. See also United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pae. R.R. Co.,
282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931).
107. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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Court 10
there
emphasized its very special application to the freedom of
8
speech.

That one, for example, might voluntarily concede his or her Sixth
Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, or accept less than the Fifth
Amendment's just compensation for a taking of property, does not mean that
the constraint by which the First Amendment limits governmental power is
similarly to be neutralized. The Speech and Press clause confers no right on
the person to be surrendered or traded away.1" Instead, it commands that
government "make no law" restricting the specially protected activities. The
restraint by which the First Amendment structurally proscribes the government's power to supervise "speech" or "press" is thus not within the
province of the individual to vacate, waive, or even moderate. Government,
therefore, can derive no authority from the individual that would empower
it to make laws regulating speech or press.110
Accordingly, cases such as D.H. Ovennyer Co. v. Frick Co."' and
Fuentes v. Shevin, which itemize the criteria for individual waiver of
constitutional rights, but which do not touch upon freedoms guaranteed under
108.
[Tihough a person has no right to a valuable governmental benefit and even though
the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his
interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person
because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to "produce a result which [it] could not command directly."
Id. at 597 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (brackets in original)). See
also Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963)) ("'It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.'").
109. While courts and commentators in discussing the First Amendment loosely interchange
the terms "rights" and "freedoms," the only "right" conferred thereunder is that of "the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government." Where the activities of speech, press
or religion are at issue, the constitutional "freedom" is secured not by vesting any "right" in the
people but through restraining the power of government. But see Schneider v. Irvington, 308
U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ("This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press
as fundamental personal rights and liberties.") (footnote omitted).
110. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Paragouldpresents a striking example of that court's
fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment. After inferring that the cable television
operator there, "[b]y entering into the franchise agreement ... effectively bargained away some
of its free speech rights," the court then finds that the operator "could have bargained [with the
city] for an unqualified right to solicit and transmit advertisements." Paragould, 930 F.2d at
1315. The court, without discussion of the obvious constitutional implications, thus holds that
local governments are at liberty to extract concessions from the cable press (e.g., a prior
restraint on the distribution of commercial speech) that would be unconstitutional per se if
imposed on any other media of mass communication. The Eighth Circuit apparently assumes
that (1) the cable television press lies outside the scope of First Amendment protections, and (2)
the city, despite the constraint by which the First Amendment limits its powers, may "bargain"
to restrict speech provided that the object of the restraint is the franchised cable operator.
111. 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
112. 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
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the First Amendment, are inapposite. While the people clearly may decide
to forego the exercise of those uniquely guarded freedoms of speech, press,
and religion, the government acts unconstitutionally when it attempts to
coerce, or even to influence, the individual's decision."'
To reason otherwise would only encourage public officials, through the
device of creative enticements, to intrude on the freedom of speech and press
1 14
thereby "produc[ing] a result which [they] could not command directly."
However irresistible the consideration (e.g., a special zoning exception to
establish a printing press, an exclusive permit to distribute publications on
public property, a franchise to construct a cable television system on public
right-of-way, or a compulsory copyright license), and whatever the will of
the individual to exchange his speech freedom therefor, the transaction
cannot enable the government to do that which the First Amendment forbids.
Government may not negotiate for the power to enact those very laws that
the Constitution bars." 5 That the individual may accept valuable consideration, and even knowingly consent to or acquiesce in the supervision of
speech and press, are factors irrelevant to the threshold question of the
government's constitutional capacity to make the facially offending regulation. " '
Whatever the participation or intent of the concerned parties, there is no
consensus, short of that prescribed under Article V of the Constitution, by
which governmental authority may generally be enabled to make laws

113. Cf Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
114. Speiser, 357 U.S. 513, 526.
115. Were government, merely through striking a bargain with the individual, able to attain
that power over speech, press, or religion which the Constitution explicitly withholds, the
constraint and the protections of the First Amendment would be a sham. But see Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (holding that "a
legislature's decision not to subsidize [through appropriation of public funds] the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right"). See also Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S. Ct. 1759,
1172 (1991) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)) (The Court upheld as
constitutional the government's selective funding of "certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest" on ground that, "'A refusal to fund [constitutionally] protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity.'"). See also Public
Broadcasting [Funding] Bill is Sidelined, N.Y. TIMBS, Mar. 5, 1992, at A14 ("Senate
Republicans . . say public broadcast stations display a consistent liberal bias in their ...
programs."). While the First Amendment tolerates the legislature's "funding" determinations,
even though such debate impacts free expression, it bars the more direct intrusion. Here, of
course, cable television regulation is not "funding." It is a series of content-related burdens and
restraints affirmatively imposed on one component of the press as a precondition to distribution
of constitutionally protected speech.
116. In light of the Supreme Court's reliance on constitutional doctrine to resolve the question,
it seems unnecessary to discuss fundamental and obviously relevant principles of contract law
regarding overriding public policy and contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1515, at 727-29 (1951); Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (3rd Cir. 1979). Cable television franchises are traditionally
let by local government authorities on a "take it, or leave it" basis. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.
§§ 541, 546 (1988). By definition, applicants for cable television franchises are largely without
bargaining power. Exacting or inferring the surrender of existing or potential First Amendment
freedoms as a condition to governmental award of a cable television franchise not only lacks a
rational basis, it would constitute bad public policy per se.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss2/7

28

Cole,: OPINION - The Cable Television "Press" and the Protection of the

1992]

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF THE CABLE

TV "PREss" 375

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. A governmental interest,
however shaped or labeled by well-meaning public officials, is not a license
to abrogate those limits constitutionally fixed on the exercise of legislative
power.
VI. CONTENT-BASED REGULATION OF THE CABLE TELEVISION "PRESS"
CONFLICTS WITH LONG-ESTABLISHED, CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT AND VALUES, AND IS CONTRARY TO THE

PUBLIC INTEREST

Given the choice between an independent press and one that is vulnerable
to the pressures of those holding public office, the Framers chose freedom.
Their decision was implemented by constitutionallyforeclosing the alternative. 117 The Federal Communications Commission, many in the Congress,
numerous states and their political subdivisions, and some courts obviously
believe that "ancient" judgment to have been extreme or, at least, to be
outmoded; and they advocate a more dependent, congenial relationship
between the contemporary press and government. Who is to say that their
theories, however incompatible with those of the Framers, lack merit or are
undeserving of consideration? It is urged only that Article V of the Constitution prescribes the exclusive process by which the First Amendment may be
abandoned and those more "modern" views accommodated.
Chief Justice Marshall, when he so elegantly framed the preeminent
proposition of constitutionally limited government in the United States, said:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained?
...

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchange-

able by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it....
•.. [I]f the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd

attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own
nature illimitable ....
[The theory of... [American] government must be, that an act of

117. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, [the Framers] amended the
Constitution so that free speech ... should be guaranteed."). See also supra note 35.
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the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.11
Nowhere does the Constitution manifest more specificity or less ambiguity
than when it restrains the power of the government to "abridg[e] the freedom
of speech, or of the press." If "ordinary legislative acts" are insufficient to
overcome a constitutionally imposed limitation upon the powers of government, then, a fortiori, legislative findings or the exercise of discretion by
administrative bodies through agency rulemaking are likewise impotent. The
invocation of a public-interest rationale hardly cures this fundamental
'
deficiency. 19
Clearly then, regulations that by calculation and effect
abridge the peoples' freedom of speech, or of the press, whatever their
dressings, are "repugnant to the constitution. " "
Some nonetheless persist in the view that those structural limitations
constitutionally proscribing government's power to restrict speech and press
are little more than guidelines for the exercise of discretion, the proviso for
deviation being a substantial public-interest rationale.'
Societal objectives, as articulated and then weighted by legislators, are said not only to
neutralize constitutionally-imposed limitations on public authority, but also
affirmatively to restore to government the requisite powers to supervise
speech and press. Expediency thus supersedes the proposition of constitutionally limited government. 2

118. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176-77.
119. When courts recognize public-interest considerations as overriding explicit constitutional
command, they reduce the First Amendment to a stature beneath that of ordinary laws. See,
e.g., Griffim v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) ("When... the terms of a
statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional
circumstances."); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (quoting Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) ("In the absence of a
'clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,' the language of the statute itself 'must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
120. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177. In the sixty years that have passed since the Court's
watershed decision in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), First Amendment law in the
United States has moved steadily closer to the more expansive Madisonian concept of freedom
of the press and much further away from Blackstone's more limited concept (viz., "liberty of
the press ... consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications," id. at 713 (quoting
4 WIuJAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151-52 (1733)).
Especially pertinent here, however, is that the subject regulation of the cable television press
constitutes a system of previous restraints upon the publication of information via that medium
of mass communication. As Chief Justice Hughes observed in Near: "the constitutional guaranty
of the liberty of the press gives immunity from previous restraints ...
" Near, 283 U.S. at
719.
121. Qr, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 122 ("Mhe public interest standard
necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles."). In the case of cable television
regulation, constitutional principles often are subordinated to the public-interest judgments of
legislators and bureaucrats thereby fundamentally inverting the established priority. See also
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25 (1934) ("[Ihe power to promote the general
welfare is inherent in government," but such power is limited by "constitutional restraint.").
122. Q. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 ("mhe particular phraseology of the constitution
of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as
other departments, are bound by that instrument.").
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The inevitable result, if the government's position is to be sustained,is
that the legislator or public official, by virtue of that pervasive sway held
over the cable television press, becomes a special force to be reckoned
with. 1" In the quest to stake out politically appealing ground, cable
television has become perhaps the safest of targets for the crusading
politician. Under the populist banner of consumer protection, legislators
assert a crucial role directly in the communicative aspects of the privatelyowned cable television media. Their avowed objective, as well as the crux
of their political theatre, is to make laws restricting the discretion of the
cable television editor over matters of a communicative character, including
the pricing, arrangement, distribution, and security of intellectual product.1" These intrusions not only confront the constitutional command, they
go directly to the core value of a free, uninhibited press thereby compromis-

123. From inception, the history of cable television has been written largely in the context of
political strife and regulatory restraints. See generally, John P. Cole, Jr., Comnunity Antenna
Television, The BroadcasterEstablishment, and the FederalRegulator, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 124
(1965); William E. Lee, Cable Franchisingand the FirstAmendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867
(1983); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Home Box Office, 567
F.2d at 44-46; Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 306-311, 317-320 (1972)
(Johnson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part); H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 22 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655. ("The Committee notes that FCC
policies in the 1960s and early 1970s unfairly inhibited the growth and development of cable.").
Apart from the perpetual trials of the local franchising relationship (including the constantly
looming, often vocalized threat of non-renewal and eviction), the highly publicized introduction
of bills in the Congress proposing restrictive, content-based regulation of the cable media has
become a perennial ritual. See, e.g., S. 12 (a bill introduced "to ensure carriage of local news
and other programming"); H.R. 3380, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). If nothing else, these
activities stimulate generous political contributions. For example, the 1989-90 Report of the
Federal Election Commission shows that the National Cable Television Association's "CablePac"
alone raised $570,475. The fact that all of this money was channeled to sitting, sensitively
positioned members of the House and Senate would seem to belie any inference that the
contributors were motivated only by their interest in good government. This is not to suggest
that our traditional political process is unlawful or even unseemly. The point is only that the
manifest dependency of the electronic press on the good will of incumbent legislators and
officials, at all levels of government, reflects adversely on the fundamental role of the First
Amendment, viz. the maintenance of a free and truly independent press. This dependency is
only greatly exacerbated when the most prominent players in the competitive market (i.e., the
rival television broadcasting networks) wield a disproportionate power to influence public
opinion and thus to shape the political process. What now has been in progress over three
decades, and that which continues to the present day, is a show-down of power politics between
media interests over television ratings and dollars. The arena has largely been the Congress and
the FCC. The public interest has played, at best, only a bit part in the contest. The Supreme
Court teaches that the constitutionally guarded liberties of speech and press must not be
subjected to "the vicissitudes of political controversy" but instead have been placed "beyond the
reach of majorities and officials." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 638.
Measured in the crucible of reality, the Court's declaration takes on mythical qualities.
124. The First Amendment gives the cable television press no immunity from the criticism of
legislators or public officials, however harsh or politically motivated that may be. The
constitutional protection is breached only when such rhetoric translates into laws substantively
interfering with the cable operator's exercise of "speech" or "press" freedoms. Cf Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) ("[First Amendment freedoms] are protected not
only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference."). There of course is little subtlety when public officials invade a private cable
editor's discretion to oversee the selection or packaging of the communicative product or to set
the price that the operator may charge therefor.
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ing the essential purpose of the First Amendment."z
Independence and vigilance give way to dependence and obsequiousness.
Courage becomes timidity. And prudent business judgment is made the
order of the day. All of this results from regulatory and franchising
measures calculated to sensitize the cable operator to the capacity of
government officials selectively to affect the direction and vitality of the
media business."2 The free exercise of communicative activity and the
financial productivity of one vehicle of information are thus squarely placed
in the political cauldron. 27 The result is a sycophantic press. Yet we are
taught that the basic law of the land is to "withdraw [press and speech] from
the vicissitudes of political controversy. " "

125. New York T7ires Co., 376 U.S. at 254. See also Near, 283 U.S. at 720 ("[Tihe
administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for [official]
malfeasance and corruption have multiplied .. ., and the danger of its protection by unfaithful
officials . . . emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press.").
126. This recurring spectacle of the cable television press being induced to importune the
political establishment for fair treatment, whether at the federal or local level, is itself at odds
with the First Amendment. When the focus of this process constitutes a veritable parade of
legislative proposals selectively and comprehensively restricting the communicative and economic
aspects of the media, it takes on the attributes of a shake down. For example, conferring
authority on the FCC or local governments to establish cable television subscription rates is
tantamount to placing the cable press under the thumb of public officials. See 47 U.S.C.S. §
543(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
127. If "speech" and "press" are not constitutionally to be subjected to "the vicissitudes of
political controversy," how then may the Federal Communications Commission lawfully exercise
unbridled discretion in a free-wheeling, highly politicized rulemaking to establish federal
standards for rate regulation of the cable television press? See 47 U.S.C.S. § 543(b) (Law. Coop. Supp. 1991); Effective Competition Standard For the Regulation of Cable Television Basic
Service Rates, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545 (1991). How may locally elected officials, whatever their
resources or ethical fortitude, realistically be expected to set cable subscription rates independent
of political influence or consequence? The constraint by which the First Amendment limits the
intrusion of government into select activities is either real or it is illusory. The press is subject
to the vagaries of content-related rulemakings and ratemakings or it is not. The editorial
judgments of private communicators may, or may not, be countermanded by public officials.
Either there are established boundaries of permissible law-making or the principle of
constitutionally limited government is largely window dressing.
128. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed., 319 U.S. at 638. The depth of the cable television
industry's dependence upon legislators is perhaps most vividly depicted by circumstances arising
during the course of the Century Communications appeal in the D.C. Circuit. The cable
operator petitioners there applied to the circuit court for a stay of the effective date of the FCC's
must carry rules pending resolution on the merits. The National Cable Television Association,
Inc., the principal trade organization of the cable television industry and an intervenor in that
case, submitted its "opposition to motion for stay," filed May 18, 1987. The trade association
explained to its membership that it had negotiated with competitive industries under the informal
aegis of the FCC Chairman and prominent members of Congress regarding must-carry regulation
and was obliged, it felt, to demonstrate support for such "consensus" rule or suffer the
consequences. The political astuteness of the Association's judgment is not questioned.
Nonetheless, we have the unprecedented display of the cable "press" sufficiently intimidated by
the specter of legislative retaliation as to encourage a content-based restraint on publication
ultimately declared unconstitutional by the reviewing court. That similarly contrived and
mislabeled "consensus" agreements between the rival factions of the electronic press are not a
rare or recent phenomenon. See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143,
284 (1972); and id. at 313-18 (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Political duress and compromise are expected, often constructive and constitutionally acceptable
ingredients of the legislative process, except where the target of government's coercion is the
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Whether a contested mayoral campaign, a Senate confirmation hearing,
or a Presidential election, the effective use of the television media through
"sound bites," "photo ops," and the like, all skillfully choreographed by the
"media consultant," is generally the single most critical ingredient in
achieving success. 1 The amount and nature of the news coverage (i.e.,
exposure) given by the television media to a particular personality or cause
more than often determines public reaction." ° Today, as much or more
than ever before, a truly independent video press is essential to the institution
of democratic government. Yet there are those who seriously contend that
the communications media primarily relied upon by today's masses to access
information and opinion are significantly less entitled to the protection of the

First Amendment than are the more traditional press vehicles."' Whether
knowingly or not, some advocate regulatory policies that, if followed, must
ultimately sacrifice the independence of the press and inevitably lead to the
co-option of the electronic media by the incumbent political establishment.1 32
The reality that cable operators "have always been regulated in many

individual's exercise of a First Amendment freedom. C. Writers Guild of America, West v.
FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1142 (S.D. Cal. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 609 F.2d 355 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (First Amendment rights may be unlawfully
abridged "through formal regulation or baekroom bludgeoning.").
129. See, e.g., Television is the Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, at 4-14; Charles
Hagan, The Photo Op: Making Icons or Playing Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1992, at H-1.
130. In the selection and arrangement of product as well as in the expression of opinion,
editors generally reflect their personal predilections. Some who exercise the prerogatives of the
press are arrogant, misguided or motivated largely by self-interest. Not just a few place a "spin"
on the "news" to promote their own personal or political agendas. Objectivity or journalistic
integrity may very well be the least common credential of the press. The cable television
component of the communications media very likely is no different from the more traditional
model. But the institution of a free press has never been conditioned upon any norm of
behavior. "A responsible press... cannot be legislated." Miami Herald Pub. Co., 418 U.S.
at 256. Freedom from the intrusion of government, despite the acknowledged, inevitable risks
of abuse, is the one essential to an independent press. See supra note 30. That this "guaranteed
freedom" may be compromised on a ground so slippery as the "substantiality" of a governmental
interest, is expediency of the most base character.
131. No one, for example, would contend that the Church of Latter-Day Saints is exempt
from, or subjected to a lesser protection under, the Free Exercise clause because that particular
denomination had not been established at the time the First Amendment was ratified. It is
"speech," "the press," and "religion" that the Constitution protects from the law-making powers
of the government. And the peoples' freedom to engage in those generic activities, so long as
their actions do not unduly infringe upon the security or "rights" of others, may not be abridged.
See supra pp. 366-71 and accompanying notes.
132. (f) Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (the First Amendment manifests "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks in government
and public officials"). This goal is wholly subverted when those in office hold the power to
selectively oversee the media and to impose ad hoc burdens or rewards-especially when it is
only the public interest that limits the exercise of their discretion. The carrot-and-stick style of
rule may well keep the people in line; but it is unconstitutional when applied to suppress First
Amendment freedoms.
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respects" does not justify content supervision of the media. 3' That
newspapers have enjoyed "a long standing and powerful tradition that
keeping government's hands off is the best way to" preserve an independent
media, t 3 is only that much more reason (the Tenth Circuit's lapse in logic
notwithstanding) to extend the tradition to all elements of the press.
Selectively regulating the judgment or revenues of a cable television
publisher is no more palatable under the First Amendment, and no less
injurious to the "profound national commitment to ... uninhibited, robust
and wide-open" debate, 3 ' than would be the same intrusion into the
deliberations of a newspaper editor." s
The independence of the press is constitutionally assured, not because
those who engage in the activity are deemed especially virtuous or even
responsible, but because the Framers perceived the potential for governmental interference in this crucial area to constitute a grave threat to a free
society. Their solution, acknowledged to be extreme and to entail risk, was
to foreclose even the specter of such intrusion through constitutionally
barring the regulation of speech and press. Cooperation between one faction
of the electronic press and well placed legislators or administrators to
promulgate policies hampering the effectiveness of the competitive cable
television media is precisely the type of intervention that is prohibited by the
First Amendment.' 37 For the effect, if not the motive, of such selective

133. Cf. Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379. The early history of cable
television regulation is replete with the summary rejection by the courts of First Amendment
claims made on behalf of cable television interests. See, e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951; Idaho Microwave
v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Buckeye Cablevision v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 225
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). Judicial
recognition that cable operators just might have "speech" rights first cane in Home Box Office,
567 F.2d at 44-48, a case decided on other grounds. See id. at 45 n.80, where the appeals court
acknowledges "incorrectly treating" the constitutional question in a compendium of prior cases.
See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979), where the Supreme
Court, in dictum, noted that claims that content-based regulation of the cable television media
raised First Amendment issues were "not frivolous." Thus any tradition of regulation of the
cable media resulting from a failing of lower courts correctly to perceive the issue is hardly a
rational basis upon which to perpetuate the unconstitutional practice.
134. Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379.
135. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
136. Cf. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 ("The press.., comprehends every sort of publication which
affords a vehicle of information. . . ."). See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757-59, 769-71
(loose standards, including specifically a "public interest" test, that authorize public officials to
exercise discretion over conduct related to speech, pose a "real and substantial" threat to a free
press and, for that reason, are facially unconstitutional).
137. There is nothing tawdry in "cozy" or mutually beneficial relationships among the "press"
and particular politicians. Neither is there indiscretion in the peoples' exercise of "the
right ... to petition the Government," as guaranteed by the First Amendment, even when the
prayer may be for business advantage. The constitutional impropriety arises only when the
government exceeds its law-making powers to burden select elements of the press or to
discriminate among "equally protected" speakers. See, e.g. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412
U.S. at 127 n.21 ("We see no principal means under the First Amendment of favoring access
by organized political parties over other groups and individuals."). The transgression is
grievously aggravated when the speech-restrictive law is enacted at the behest of one component
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regulation is to make both factions of the press beholden to the political
establishment, one hopefully to escape or mitigate the legislature's shackles
and the other to maintain the contrived advantage. In each instance, it is the
core value of an independent press that is improvidently compromised. The
making of any law facially abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
requires a basis beyond hard-ball politics.
Speech, religion, and the press are protected in the United States not
because the government promotes, or even encourages, those activities but
because the First Amendment bars its intrusion. Those who publish
periodicals, or who produce books, motion pictures or programming, or who
hold governmental licenses to operate broadcasting or cable television media,
while enabled to broadly propagate their own views and thereby disproportionately to influence public opinion, are not morally or intellectually
superior to other citizens. Their speech, however wise or important, is not
"better" than the speech of others-certainly not in any constitutional sense.
The fact that some of these mass-communicators are able to coalesce their
formidable tools into a politically effective lobby able to work its will on a
pliant legislature
is not a reason to subjugate the command of the First
138
Amendment.
In the venerable words of Chief Justice Marshall, constitutions are
"superior paramount law" enacted in order that "those limits" imposed by
the people on the authority of government "may not be mistaken or
forgotten." Whether one regards the Constitution from the perspective of a
strict or lenient constructionist, whatever prejudices these labels may be
of the media to disadvantage another. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S655 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992)
(statement of Sen. Wirth) ("What this debate [on cable television bill S.12], then, is all about
is those who want to use the political process, as has been done since the beginning of
telecommunications, . . . to limit one group of people, to keep them out of growing."). See id.
at S654-S656. See also Face-off on Must Pay, BROADCASTING, Apr. 2, 1990, at 43, 43 ("CBS
President Laurence Tisch was on Capitol Hill last week plugging the legislation. .. ."); id at
44 ("If broadcasters succeed in wining must pay, Larry Tisch's right-hand man will get major
credit, he's become a major force in company, in industry and in Washington.").
138. Any must-carry regime, under which the government substantively classifies and prefers
select speakers over others, constitutes an egregious, indefensible infringement on First
Amendment freedoms. Television broadcast stations and cable television operators are
unquestionably "press." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 116; Leathers, 111 S. Ct.
at 1442. National broadcasting networks (e.g., CBS) and cable television networks (e.g., CNN,
C-SPAN, ESPN, BET and, yes, MTV), which affiliate with cable systems to distribute
communications to mass audiences, are equally "press." Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 (the "press
...
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion."). Each of these media enjoys the protection of the First Amendment. Yet the Senate
has passed (S. 12), and the House is considering, a provision one purpose of which is to restrict
the discretion of the cable television editor by mandating an official pecking order on these
speakers. The dogma is that the speech of local television stations is of greater public benefit
than that of the other speakers and, accordingly, warrants governmental preference. But even
were this value-judgment to be verified, the scheme is flagrantly unconstitutional. While
legislators may individually opine their preference for the "speech" or "press" of those favored
with broadcasting licenses, they violate the First Amendment when they legislate that priority.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 4849; Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. of
California, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973).
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intended to impart, the Supreme Court has never inferred from the First
Amendment the proviso, "unless the law shall be deemed to serve the public
interest." The constitutional command makes no distinction between good
and bad laws. It says: "no law." The theory that First Amendment values
may result from, and thereby vindicate, the facially unconstitutional
abridgment is a non sequitur.139 Regulatory restrictions on "speech"
freedoms, whatever the motivation or promise, are without a constitutionally
redeeming quality.1"
Writing for the Court specifically in the context of broadcast-licensing
regulation, where the government's authority over speech is significantly
greater than with respect to any other media of mass communication, Chief
Justice Burger, bowing to the underlying theme of the First Amendment,
stated: "Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher
values ... ."41

It is precisely those "higher values" that are sacrificed

when deliberate intrusions on "the guaranteed freedom of expression" are
rationalized on the basis of an interests-balancing analysis. 42 The cable
television press is not exempt from the protection of the First Amendment;
and likewise, the government, where cable speech is involved, is not relieved
of its constraint.
The general public has never advocated, nor shown an interest in, a
cable must-carry regulation. The intense political pressure for this unique
speaker-preference comes solely from an effective broadcasting lobby. Yet
the lone justification given for this special-interests exception to the
constitutional rule is that must-carry is a public necessity. 43 In contrast,
the public has expressed interest in the subject of cable television subscriber
rates. But price increases for media publications, whatever the consumer
reaction, do not vitiate the freedom that the First Amendment guarantees to
the press. Constitutional constraints on governmental power are not
139. C. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176 (The Constitution represents the will of the people
and "is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected .... The principles,
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental."). When legislators compromise these
principles, even when their action may reflect overwhelmingly the popular will or truly serve
the public interest, the Constitution becomes anything and everything but "fundamental" or
"supreme." Id.
140. Laws that intrude indiscriminately to facilitate distribution of or public access to speech
or press, such as postal regulations that authorize lower mail rates for "educational" or
"informational" publications (39 U.S.C. § 3622 (1988)), do not conflict with the First
Amendment. Laws that facially proclaim such goals but which in purpose or substance
selectively classify and favor certain speakers or press organs over others, do abridge the
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of those less favored. Thus while the legislature may make
laws regarding "speech" or "press" activities, it may not do so when the intention or effect of
its action is to restrict the activity or to discriminate among those who hold those guaranteed
freedoms. Public funding is the one exception to the rule. See supra note 115.
141. Columbia BroadcastingSys., 412 U.S. at 125 (1973).
142. Id. See also supra notes 38 & 39.
143. Blurring the distinction between special interests and the public interest is an age-old
political tactic but one hardly sufficient to lull courts into a constitutionally submissive
role--especially when it is the command of the First Amendment that the legislature facially
overrides.
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subsumed because, in context, they implicate consumer issues or generate
politically attractive causes.'" Placing cosmetically pleasing titles on laws

that overtly abridge the freedoms of speech and press145 neither conceals
the substance of the legislation nor deflects the demanding scrutiny required
by the First Amendment. 1"
Content-related restrictions on the distribution of "fully protected"
speech via the media of mass communication, especially those applied at the
discretion of government officials, affront the express provisions of the First
Amendment. The fact that those who exercise their discretion may do so
pursuant to authority delegated by the legislature is inconsequential. For
such creation, being in excess of the legislature's charter, is itself unconstitutional.147 Equally unavailing is the legislature's proclamation that the
press-restrictive law will serve the best interests of the people. A constitutional command is not something to be manipulated "when the legislature
shall please to alter it," particularly not on the basis of a standard so
susceptible to subjective construction as the public interest.'"

144. When in 1991, The New York Times increased its daily newsstand price one hundred
percent, the First Amendment was not nullified. Yet a far smaller rise in cable television
subscription rates over a six-year span (i.e., "40 percent") has recently persuaded the U.S.
Senate to pass a bill regulating the charges of the cable television press. 138 Cong. Rec. S760
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1992) (S.12, § 2(1)). See also id. at S762 (S.12, § 623) ("Regulation of
Rates"). Were there no barrier to rate regulation of the electronic media, why has not the
Congress focused on the skyrocketing costs of broadcast advertising? See, e.g., Michael Lev,
Super Bowl 25: The Football Hoopla Yields to Hype, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1991, at F5 (On the
biggest ad day of the year, advertising time during the Super Bowl cost $800,000 for 30
seconds. While ratings decrease, advertising costs have doubled since 1984 and tripled since
1980). Any such intrusion into the revenue stream of private broadcast networks or stations
would affect program creativity, thereby unconstitutionally imposing a censorial restraint on the
freedom of speech and press. The rationale pertains no less to the cable television media.
145. See, e.g., S.12, § I ("This Act may be cited as the 'Cable Television Consumer
Protection Act of 1992.'").
146. None of this discussion is to suggest that the press is immune from the antitrust statutes
or from any other laws generally governing the society. Exception is taken under the First
Amendment only to those regulations specially designed to burden the communications media.
See supra notes 88-90 and cases cited therein. Describing press-specific, content-based laws as
"economic regulations," S.Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (accompanying S.12 to
the Senate floor), does not alter the substantive fact that they purposefully and selectively abridge
the cable operator's freedom of speech and press and thus facially confront the command of the
First Amendment. Cf.Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444; Miami HeraldPub. Co., 418 U.S. at 254.
Not even those adjudged unlawful monopolists under Title 15 of the U.S. Code are stripped of
their First Amendment freedoms. Rate regulation of water, electric power or telephone services
does not implicate speech or press; regulation of the cable television media does. Cf.Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 120 (There is a "basic distinction" between regulation of the
communications media and a "utility that itself derives no protection from the First Amendment.").
147. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 15, at 285 ("Congress can give away only what is its to
give, [and] the most obvious limits on legislative delegation [include] action .. .inconsistent
with constitutional prohibitions. .. ."). No action of government is more squarely prohibited
than is "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
148. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. The fallacy, indeed grave danger, in basing First
Amendment protections on the judgments of men (see infra note 158) rather than on law and
principle is readily illustrated by the Century Communications case itself. There a five-person
regulatory commission and a two-judge appellate court, each acting in good faith on the same
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Denigration of loose standards when it is the exercise of constitutionally
guaranteed rights or freedoms that is at issue is hardly original to the author.
In circumstances involving "equal protection" claims under the Fifth
Amendment, where a significantly lesser scrutiny is required, then Justice
Rehnquist once said:
How is this Court to define what objectives are important? How is
it to determine whether a particular law is "substantially" related to
the achievement of such objective, rather than related in some other
way to its achievement? Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous
and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices
relating to particular types of legislation, masquerading as judgments
whether such legislation is directed at "important" objectives or,
whether the relationship to those objectives is "substantial"
enough.'49
Can any standard, we ask, be more "diaphanous" or "elastic" than is the
"substantiality of the governmental interest"? Could there be a more direct
invitation to construe subjectively the Constitution than to charge reviewing
judges with balancing the public interest vis-a-vis the express provisions of
the First Amendment? Does the command of the First Amendment have any
meaning at all when the principal function of judges and justices is made one
of weighing assorted interests? Are legislatures or their delegees afforded
any ascertainable measure of constitutionality when it is the adhoc estimation
of judges that is controlling? Such standard is, in truth, no standard at all.
In the considered opinion of not just a few (now including several federal
circuit courts, a large majority of the U.S. Senate and the federal agency
primarily charged with the regulation of electronic communications), the
question of the protection constitutionally due a cable television operator is
already, as Mr. Justice Stewart in a slightly different context feared, little
more than what "a majority of th[e] Court [or a political body] at any
particular moment might consider First Amendment 'values' to require. " "
set of facts and both ruling unanimously, reached diametrically opposite conclusions regarding
the central question of where the public interest comes down on the O'Brien scale. Except for
cursory summations neither body explains how it anives at its particular reading. And either
could reverse its finding with a similar lack of elaboration.
149. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. See supra note 39. Wholly apart from the question of constitutionality and the political
advocacy of the special-interests, do the people truly need, or want, their public servants to
designate those "speech" or "press" sources that may, or must, be accessible over their home
television receiver sets? That legislators may label the governmental interest in such a
regulatory scheme as "substantial," or even "compelling," is by itself hardly sufficient to nullify
the solemn obligation of judges "to discharge [their] duties agreeably to the constitution of the
United States." Marbury, 5 U.S. (ICranch) at 180. The very idea of the government inviting
the broadcast licensees and their lobbyists to debate, whether in the halls of Congress, in formal
legislative hearings or through agency rulemakings, the establishment of an officially constituted
hierarchy for speakers, is itself incompatible with the First Amendment. See, e.g., "Show and
Tell 7ime" S-12 Still On Track in Senate, As Lobbying Accelerates, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 10,

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss2/7

38

Cole,: OPINION - The Cable Television "Press" and the Protection of the

1992]

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF THE CABLE

TV "PRESS" 385

Thus, that "frightening specter," which Justice Stewart only hypothesized,

has in some circles become a reality. The premise of this commentary is that
the Constitution is due considerably more deference than has been accorded
by these lower courts and legislative bodies.
When the First Amendment is perceived as authority for the legislature
affirmatively to make laws abridging the "speech" or "press" freedom of a
select few provided that the restriction is deemed to enhance the convenience
or freedom of a greater portion of the people, the limitation constitutionally
placed on the exercise of governmental power is corrupted. For that which
the Framers put into the Constitution solely to restrain the law-making power
of the government talismanically becomes the source for exercise of that very
power. Those who see the constraintof the First Amendment as all things
for all people not only demonstrate extraordinary imagination, they disavow
its stated purpose.
Liberties guaranteed to all the people by the First Amendment, especially
that of a press free from governmental control or intimidation, are not
objects of patronage to be selectively dispensed (or withheld) by public
officials depending upon their perception of societal goals or the public
interest. Laws enacted purposefully to abridge anyone's freedom of speech
or press, even though they may be public spirited, are presumptively
unconstitutional and, unless justified by a vital, compelling governmental
interest and narrowly drawn to preserve that articulated interest, are
void.151 There has never been the first attempt so to justify the content-

1992, at 2; House Prospects Not Clear, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 14, 1992, at 1, 1 ("House Minority
Leader Michel (R-111.) at NAB legislative forum ... endorsed must-carry and retransmission
consent."). See also Randy Sukow, NAB Has Steam Upfor Cable Showdown, BROADCASTING,

Jan. 13, 1992, at 10-11 (quoting a prominent broadcast-industry lobbyist) (discussing the powerpolitics of pending "must carry and retransmission consent" legislation and the concept that "to
a member of Congress, a person who runs a TV or radio station is a very important fellow.").
If the First Amendment is to stand for anything at all it is that the uniquely guarded activities
of speech, press and religion are insulated from politics. There of course is no misbehavior
when individual politicians pay homage to industry gatherings voicing support for the groups'
legislative agenda. The constitutional infraction occurs when they, as a legislative body, enact
content-based laws that target a select component of the press for the benefit of the favored
media-constituency. Not only are such laws defective under the First Amendment they are in
the nature of a Bill of Attainder and barred under Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the
Constitution. Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
151. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S.
at 639 ("[Flreedoms of speech and of the press... may ... be infringed only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."). Officially favoring
one fully protected speaker over another is anathema to the First Amendment. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 48-49. See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 475 U.S. at 14 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 49) (While public utility has no "right to be free from vigorous debate" it "does have the right
to be free from government restrictions that abridge its own [speech] rights in order to 'enhance
the relative voice' of its opponents."). If "consumer protection" regulations cannot justify a
utility's compelled publication of another's speech then, a fortiori, mandating an independent
component of the press to distribute the programming and commercial advertisements of another
is likewise unconstitutional. See San Antonio School District, 411 U.S. at 17 (Where
governmental classification "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected
by the Constitution," the test must be one of "strict judicial scrutiny.").
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based regulation of the cable television media.152
CONCLUSION

Speech is "speech" and press is "press." And the particular means by
which one engages in the expressive activity, so long as it is lawful, is not
a consideration material or relevant to the question of the protection
constitutionally due the communicator, the communication, or the massmedia consumer.' 53 No one has suggested that communication via cable
television circuits is unlawful or even unsavory.
In every instance where a restriction on "speech" or "conduct" is
contested on First Amendment grounds, there arises a preliminary inquiry:
Is the subject regulation on its face content-related, press-specific, or communicative in its reach? When the answer is in the negative, the "alleged,"
incidental impingement on First Amendment freedom is then reviewed under
O'Brien's more lenient standard. When this threshold inquiry is resolved in
the affirmative, however, and it is the "press" or "speech" that is "targeted ... in a purposeful attempt to interfere with... First Amendment
activities," the constitutional analysis must be searching and exacting." 5
To construe the First Amendment's command as conferring discretion on the
legislative branch of the government to make laws restricting speech and
press whenever it is in the public interest to do so, subject to the deferential
review of the judicial branch, is to reject not only the notion of a "written
constitution" but the theme of constitutionally limited government as
well. 155
152. The question treated here is not what might, or might not, constitute a "compelling
governmental interest" sufficient to justify government's deliberate abridgement of "speech"
freedoms, see, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 319-21, but rather whether intentional abridgement is
always and minimally to be "subjected to the most exacting scrutiny," id. at 321. See Justice
Kennedy's analysis of First Amendment principles in the review of New York's Son of Sam
law, supra text accompanying note 81. The one exception to this rule arises when the speechrestrictive regulation is directed to those licensed by the Federal Communications Commission
to use radio broadcasting frequencies. In those situations, an analysis of the constitutional
question within the confines of the scarcity doctrine may be appropriate. See supra notes 93-102
and accompanying text.
153. For example, intentionally defacing one's draft card, O'Brien, or engaging in public
nudity, Barnes, II1S.Ct. 2456, is conduct legislatively restricted and declared unlawful. In
neither case is there any question relating to the constitutional capacity of the respective
legislatures to so restrict the targeted conduct. Where persons nevertheless chcose to
communicate through such conduct, they do so consciously accepting the consequences of their
action. In contrast, where the cable television "press" is targeted for communicative regulation,
there arises not only a question as to the legislature's power to enact the speech-intrusive
measure, but also the strong presumption that the enactment facially exceeds the authority of
government, as limited by the First Amendment, and is thus unconstitutional.
154. Leathers, 111 S.Ct. at 1444. See also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at
592-93; Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233; Simon & Schuster, 112 S.Ct. 501.
155. Marbury, 5 U.S. (ICranch) at 176-77. See also id. at 178 ("If, then, the courts are to
regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply."). No
one, for example, has a "First Amendment right" to The New York imes, to Gone with the
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If the making of laws that facially and selectively "abridg[e] the freedom
of speech, or of the press" requires nothing more than interests balancing,
then it follows that government may make "law[s] respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" subject to the same
forgiving standard. For the Speech and Press clause and the Establishment
and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment originate from a common
constitutional source and impose the identical stricture on the law-making
powers of government. 11 Either the express provisions of the First
Amendment are substantive or they may be cast aside on the basis of resultdriven findings duly entered by legislators or their delegees and endorsed by
reviewing judges.157
Introducing the variable of discretion to the protection afforded speech
and press, whether it be of the administrative or judicial variety, is to exalt
the predilections and bias of personality over the constitutional command.
When the express provisions of the First Amendment are made secondary
and the protection constitutionally due the press a judgment call, then the
particular person making the call becomes the dominant factor in the
equation.15 Politics and establishment politicians ascend at the direct cost

Wind (the book or the motion picture) or to a ticket to a political convention or the Super Bowl,
even when the event may take place in a publicly owned arena. The First Amendment provides
the people no right of access to express themselves in the pages of The Washington Post or in
any other private publication including the broadcasting media. What the First Amendment does
affirmatively do is guarantee that the government "shall make no law" selectively interfering in
those activities or relationships. "Speech," "the press," and "religion" are uniquely set aside
as private preserves where the ad hoc intrusion of restrictive governmental regulation is
constitutionally prohibited. But see Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967), suggesting a creative concept along those same lines as that
rejected by the Court in Miami Herald Pub. Co. as "a confrontation with the express provisions
of the First Amendment. See Miami Herald Pub. Co., 418 U.S. at 254.
156. Even to suggest that the legislature, however noble its goals or compelling its findings,
may empower itself to enact laws establishing a state-preferred religion or interfering in the free
exercise of another religion, would be constitutional heresy. Yet the FCC and some lower
courts invoke precisely that rationale to justify facial abridgments on "speech" and "press"
freedoms. There is no attempt even to discuss this radical inconsistency in the application of
the First Amendment's command. Cf. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425, 429-30 (1962)
(Black, J., for a unanimous Court) ("It is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people...
.") ("The First Amendment ... stand[s] as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal
Government would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American
people can say.... .. "). Like prayer, the activities of speech and press are equally freed from
governmental intimidation.
157. What is in the public interest according to one regulator, or judge, may not be when
viewed from the perspective of another. The particular weight attached to the governmental
interest at issue vis-a-vis the abridgment is purely the subjective opinion of the person making
the judgment. What is perceived on the O'Brien scales as substantial today may be de minimis
tomorrow. A guaranteed freedom so lacking in definition or stability as to take its vitality from
the momentary perceptions of legislatures or public officials is meaningless.
158. Cf. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. ("The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."). Giving free rein to legislators
and administrators, or even to justices, creatively to apply unmistakable constitutional command
is literally to make sovereigns of men. When the "substantiality of the governmental interest,"
Century Communications Corp., 835 F.2d at 300, determines the extent of the protection
afforded speech and press, the Constitution gives way to men.
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of the rule of law. Principle becomes a transitory consideration. And the
First Amendment is politicized.'- Yet, constitutionally limited government
is distinguished from the more totalitarian regime chiefly by the former's
recognition that fundamental law must consistently be applied under objective
principles of neutrality."w "Freedom of speech is indivisible; unless we
protect it for all, we will have it for none.""'
None of this is meant to discount the proposition that discretion plays a
prominent, necessary role in deciding, for example, whether knowingly
burning one's draft card may be "speech" or whether nude dancing is
"expression," and, if so, the degree of constitutional protection to which
those engaging in such conduct may be entitled when balanced against the
legitimate governmental interests in maintaining a military or prohibiting

159. With the possible exception of the Fin/Syn controversy in which the commercial television
broadcasting networks and Hollywood are pitted against each other in a monumental battle at
the FCC for the control of programming valued at billions of dollars annually, nothing has been
more politicized than the regulation of the cable television media. See Evaluation of the
Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 6 F.C.C.R. 3094 (1991), recon. granted in part and
den. in part, 7 F.C.C.R. 345 (1991), appealpending sub. nom. Schurz Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, No. 91-2350 (7th Cir.). See also Harry A. Jessell & Kim MeAvoy, White House
Sends Loud and Clear Fin-Syn Signals, BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1991, at 27; Harry A. Jessell,
FCC Plots End to Fin-Syn in Three Years, BROADCASTING, Feb. 25, 1991, at 19; Harry A.
Jessell, Fin-Syn Looms as Disasterfor Networks, BROADCASTING, Mar. 11, 1991, at 19;
Edmund L. Andrews, Syndication Gain is Seen for Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1991, at
33 (The FCC "will ultimately determine who will control the S3 billion market for television
reruns."). When dollars of such magnitude are at issue, and it is the discretion of public
officials that is the decisive factor, the media participants by nature are hopelessly co-opted.
160. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21 (1975). Is it even arguably constitutional for public officials to classify fully
protected speakers or media forms and to prioritize those classifications in the context of relative
rights to publication or distribution? Does anyone seriously contend that the freedom to
communicate fully protected speech is, as a matter of legislative discretion, greater for some of
the people than for others? Could it ever be respectably suggested that the legislature may
selectively use its law-making power to place restraints on one "press" vehicle at the instance
or for the benefit of another? When these fundamental questions are consciously avoided,
whether the neglectful party may be the legislature itself or a reviewing court, there is an
unconstitutional abuse of power or a default in constitutional responsibility, or both.
161. Harry Klaven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 428, 432 (1967). Rate regulation of the cable television media might, on
balance, produce salutary benefits to the public, as might laws guaranteeing every person's
access to "good" newspapers, books, or motion-pictures at reasonable costs. Laws establishing
the individual's right to expression in those publications, especially where they seek only to rebut
representations impugning their person or to speak out on issues of community importance, may
likewise be perceived as fulfilling substantial societal goals. Anticipating that a political body
might find that Yankee and Met's fans have established their "right" to continue to view the
games of those teams on their "free" home television receivers-notwithstanding any contrary
interest that may be held by the owners or creators of those events-is hardly far-fetched. But
such findings, however rationalized or popular, do not debilitate the constraint by which the First
Amendment limits the making of laws that abridge the freedom of speech or press. Government, while at liberty to promote conditions conducive to achievement of those societal goals
it deems worthy, may not in the process compromise anyone's First Amendment freedom. The
greatest virtue of constitutional government is that the guaranteed freedom of a few may not
consciously be sacrificed for the benefit of those who wield or are able to influence majority
power.
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public nudity.162 The discretion frowned upon here is only that where
legislators or bureaucrats assume liberties to revise, and even to ignore, the
express provisions of the First Amendment. The theory that legislatures and

public officials are foreclosed from the regulation of the "press" or "speech"
only when they, in good faith, choose to recognize that limitation constitutionally fixed upon their powers is one at odds not only with precedent but
with plain common sense."
"The precise level of First Amendment protection due a cable television
operator," to revisit Judge Wald's Century Communicationsopinion, is likely
a question that will go unanswered to everyone's satisfaction until the
Supreme Court decides to meet the issue head-on. Whether the Court will
turn to an established standard of constitutional review, or whether it may
create an altogether new doctrine peculiar to the cable television press, is not
known. What we must know, however, is that the O'Brien standard, applied
to date by many courts as well as by the FCC in the review of communicative supervision of the cable television media, is inapposite to those
regulations that on their face implicate the freedom of "speech" or
"press.""6
Constitutional jurisprudence would be well-served if courts and
regulatory bodies (especially those professed to hold special expertise in
communications) would desist from the notion that the First Amendment so
readily yields to the temptation of majority power. When fundamental
freedoms constitutionally guaranteed to the people are conditioned upon the
machinations of the political process, there is more than a touch of duplicity.
When the command of the First Amendment is subjugated to the "substantiality" of a governmental interest, and the legislature, depending upon its
assessment of that interest, is ipso facto freed to make laws abridging the

162. Government unquestionably possesses the power to raise an army or to restrict public
nudity. In contrast, the Constitution deprives government of the power to make laws abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press. Yet some would apply the identical standard of review
in assessing the constitutionality of these fundamentally distinctive governmental actions.
163. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 180 ("A law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
...
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."). An act of the
legislature that facially exceeds Article I powers or that breaches an explicit constitutional
restraint, and which therefore is ultra vires, is not ratified by the legislature's accompanying
determination that the law is intended to further an important governmental interest. When
Article III judges defer to such legislative usurpation, they not only abdicate their designated
responsibilities under the separation-of-powers doctrine, they contort the system of checks and
balances that is the keystone of American constitutional government. See id. at 177 ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). And
it is "the constitution [that] must govern." Id. at 178.
164. The function of the Speech and Press clause is to delineate a constraint on the exercise
of governmental power. Legislators who find in the First Amendment the power affirmatively
to make laws abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, do indeed draw blood from the
proverbial turnip. There is manipulation of the very worst sort when legislatures rationalize that
their deliberate transgression of the constitutional limitation is undertaken with good intentions
and, therefore, is permissible. First Amendment dividends do not derive from laws that facially
abridge an individual's freedom of speech or press. Unconstitutional restraints do not produce
constitutional values.
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liberties of speech and press, there is invitation to skulduggery. If, indeed,
the regulation of speech and press is foreclosed by the First Amendment, the
discretion of public officials, however constructively exercised, is insufficient
to overcome the underlying want of authority. If government is constitutionally disabled from overseeing "speech" and "press" activities, or from
establishing a "religion," the institutional void is hardly filled by declarations
of public convenience, whether they emanate from legislators, regulators, or
eminent jurists."~
Accepting the reality that elective politics and campaign funding are the
driving force, perhaps even the principal virtue, of the legislative process,
equally as certain is that such considerations sometime lead to the abuse of
power. "[M]en entrusted with power tend to abuse it."" However, the
enduring wisdom of the American system of government is that the separatebut-equal power of the judiciary stands, unencumbered by concerns of
popular preference and political ambition, as the "check" on those unconstitutional excesses. 7
Only the Congress and the individual states, acting in accordance with
Article V of the Constitution, may enable the government in the general
furtherance of societal goals directly to abridge the freedoms of "speech" and
"press." Some obviously believe that the press (or select components
thereof) should be restricted in constructive respects, and that the time is ripe
for amendment of the First Amendment."~ It has been done before (e.g.,
the 21st Amendment repealing the 18th Amendment). The constitutionally
prescribed procedures are clear and certain; legislatures and courts, even in
concert, are powerless to abbreviate the process."
165. Reduced to essence, the theory of constitutional law espoused by those who would
content-regulate the press is essentially one of self-help, i.e., the findings of the legislative
branch are sufficient to enable the government to make and execute those very laws that the First
Amendment explicitly forbids. Put another way, the contention is that "speech" and "press"
freedoms may be abridged provided the end-result is perceived by the perpetrator as manifesting
First Amendment values. Mr. Justice Stewart, ever the gentleman, called this a "strange
convolution." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 133 (Stewart, J., concurring).
166. 11 MONTEsQUIEU, supra note 86, at 4. Those elected to public office as well as those
appointed to positions of great trust and power take a solemn oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution. For too many, that pledge, when it conflicts with prepossession, is a frivolity.
167. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177-80. Any time an ordinary law and the Bill of Rights
collide it is, with only the rarest of exception, the Constitution that survives. When popular
ideals or political demagoguery, or a combination thereof, are sufficient to reverse this priority,
Article I legislators seize "the very essence of judicial duty" that the Constitution reserves
exclusively to Article III judges. Id. at 178. See also id. at 180 ("Why does a judge swear to
discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States if that constitution forms
no rule for his government?").
168. The proposition that television content is all too important to the national fabric to be left
to the devices of the people may not entirely be lacking in popular appeal or even merit. More
to the point, however, the First Amendment preempts any hard choice because the framers
confronted and determined the alternative as the greater evil.
169. The "people have an original right to establish, for their future government," a
constitution, and the "exercise of the original right is a very great exertion" manifesting
"principles . . . deemed fundamental" and "designed to be permanent." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 176.
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The glaring weakness-and fatal constitutional infirmity-in the thesis of
those who urge that governmental abridgments on the freedom of speech and
press are acceptable when intended to advance constructive public goals, is
the question of who is to make those ad hoc determinations. For what is
acceptable or correct will inevitably be decided on the basis of politics. And
that precisely is why the Speech and Press clause was framed as a structural
restraint on the exercise of governmental power. The majesty of the First
Amendment lies in its imperviousness to majority power. When this abiding
neutrality is infected by perceptions of public good or through appeal to the
prejudices or subjective interests of some, constitutional government is
subverted." 7 Those who today search for ways to bend the First Amendment to accommodate their pet project or cause will, if successful, be among
those who tomorrow decry the demise of its integrity.
If ever there were vindication for the Framers' fear of governmental
intimidation and thus their resolve constitutionally to separate press and
speech from the law-making powers of the legislature, it is the thirty-year
travail of cable television regulation. The intricate involvement of the
broadcasting, motion picture and cable television lobbies with the politicians
belies anything approaching an independent media. When the legislature
makes itself, or its administrative delegee, the source of selective business
favors and sanctions as well as the arbiter of commercial rivalries among the
electronic media, all elements of the press are compromised. 7 1 That a
public official's relationship with the electronic press typically warrants the
most careful cultivation is only that much more reason to give the First
Amendment its due."
The surest method by which to reverse the generally constructive course
of First Amendment law since Near is to apply a less demanding or relatively
lenient standard of judicial review to those laws that facially clash with the
constitutional command. Nothing will better undermine the independence of
"a vigilant and courageous press" than a forgiving standard of First
Amendment review that permits, indeed invites, the mischief of politicians

170. Could the Southern Baptist denomination, because of its origin or "localism" be officially
preferred over Roman Catholicism or Judaism? The essential genius of the First Amendment,
whether the subject is speakers or religions, is equality under the law.

171. That many in the mass media, including some cable television operators, find the present
system to their individual liking is not reason to compromise the public's overriding interest in

a free press.

A "don't-rock-the-boat"

mentality, however pervasive or commercially

comfortable, is not the elixir that enables the legislature to exceed its constitutionally limited

powers.
172. None of this discussion is intended to deprecate the legislator, the public official or the
political process each of which is basic to any democracy. Nevertheless, the realities of public
life and the underlying function of the First Amendment cannot be ignored. Were there no
historically demonstrated potential for the abuse of governmental power, there would be no need
for a First Amendment.
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into the private media of communication. 3
Contemporary legislators, public officials and judges may well be in a
better position than were the Framers of two centuries ago to determine
which of today's "press" and "speech" activities ought to be constitutionally
protected and those that should not. With equal logic, one can contend that
these same officials possess a greater, manifestly more modern insight into
those powers that legislatures should be able to exert. But how may
reviewing courts defer to legislative impulses that facially contradict the
express provisions of the First Amendment and, at the same time, maintain
even the semblance of constitutionally limited government? Why have an
oath to uphold a constitution if that document is subjected to the caprice of
those who wield political power? Why have a Bill of Rights if the restraints
imposed on governmental authority and the freedoms guaranteed to the
people may be extinguished by the legislature's public interest finding? Why
even have a constitution? Chief Justice Marshall addressed each of these
questions in an opinion that will mark its 190th anniversary this coming
February, one that not only endures to the present day but is unmatched in
its contributions to the American system of constitutional government.
If all that be required to make laws abridging the freedom of "speech"
and "the press" is the well-founded public-interest proclamations of
legislators or officials, supported by the concurrences of those who wear
black robes, then the Constitution, in the words of the great Chief Justice,
is indeed an absurd attempt to limit the power of the government. 74 If, on
the other hand, the time-tested values and fundamental integrity of the First
Amendment's command, despite the "[c]alculated risks of abuse," are

173. Where regulations that facially abridge "speech" or "press" activities are involved, the
virtue of First Amendment law lies in the premise that public officials not only are not called
upon to make judgment calls, they are foreclosed from doing so. The encroachments made by
the government over the past fifty years through its licensing of the broadcasting press and the
unhealthy effects of communicative intrusions on the independence of that particular component
of the mass media, as recently acknowledged by the Federal Communications Commission, is
a subject matter reserved for another day. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043,
5043 (1987) ("[W]e conclude that the fairness doctrine [applicable to broadcasting licensees],
on its face, violates the First Amendment and contravenes the public interest."), aff'd on
narrowergrounds sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 717 (1990) (upholding as dispositive agency's conclusion that
fairness doctrine no longer served the public interest and therefore no need even to reach the
constitutional issue). There is an inexplicable inconsistency when the FCC at the same time
characterizes content-based restraints on the cable television press as merely incidental to speech
activity, and purports to constitutionally justify them on the basis of a simplistic interestsbalancing formula. Cf.FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
174. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177. When judges view their role in the constitutional
trinity as that of creatively classifying "the press" and "speakers" into sub-categories with
descending degrees of protection from governmental intrusion, they not only gratuitously inject
their own personalities into the adjudication, they substantively edit the text of the First
Amendment to accommodate those subjective views. Cf. id. at 180.
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deemed worthy of preservation, strict scrutiny is the appropriate course.175
The choice would not appear a particularly "vexing" one. Among other
considerations, the forefathers have already entered their constitutional
judgment-one, at least at this stage, that presumably will influence the
decision-making of regulators and judges.

175. Cf.Columbia BroadcastingSys., 412 U.S. at 125. See generally Martin H. Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 151 (1981)
(concluding that "as long as the courts begin each case with the premise that expression may be
regulated only in the presence of a truly compelling governmental interest, the values of free
expression will be appropriately served").
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